Category: Research Notes

CAA revisited: How the May 2021 order of the MHA furthers a discriminatory citizenship regime

Featured parichayteam2 Comments

On May 28, 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs passed an order under Section 16 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 which empowers the Central Government to delegate powers under the Act. However, exceeding mere delegation, this o rder created a specific procedure for naturalisation and registration for citizenship in respect of applicants from ‘minority communities’ in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, namely Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Parsis and Buddhists, resident in specified districts in five states. This order was immediately challenged by the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) in an interlocutory application that they filed in an earlier writ petition challenging the constitutionality of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019. IUML’s primary objection was that this order seeks to implement the CAA 2019 in a roundabout fashion, even while the constitutionality challenge is under examination by the Supreme Court. The Union Government in its reply stated that the notification had nothing to do with the CAA, and merely allows for delegation of powers of registration and naturalisation under certain specific circumstances, to a class of ‘legal’ migrants. As on date, two other writ petitioners who challenged the CAA, have filed applications also challenging this order.

At Parichay, we have prepared a detailed brief on the May 2021 order. This brief sets out the contents of the May 2021 order, and its relation, if any, to the CAA 2019. To summarise, this brief argues the following:

  1. The CAA, 2019 exempts persons belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Jain, Parsi or Buddhist communities from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh from falling within the definition of “illegal migrant” in Section 2(1)(b) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. We argue that this amended definition now allows even those without valid documents to apply for citizenship under the procedure laid down under May 2021 notification. However, this benefit is not available to similarly situated Muslim applicants.
  2. The May 2021 order significantly truncates the procedure for registration and naturalisation of citizens under Sections 5 and 6 of the Citizenship Act, but denies similarly situated Muslim applicants this benefit.
  3. The May 2021 order implements the amendment to the Third Schedule of the Citizenship Act, 1955 brought into force by the CAA, 2019. This amendment reduced the residency requirement for naturalisation under Section 6 from 11 years to 5 years for Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Jain, Parsi or Buddhist communities per se (without any requirement of claiming religious persecution) who come from Afghanistan, Pakistan or Bangladesh.
  4. The May 2021 order creates a distinction between applicants of Indian origin for the purposes of registration under Section 5, by retaining what is admittedly an onerous and difficult process of citizenship registration for Muslims of Indian origin, while easing the process for Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Christians, Buddhists and Parsis of Indian origin.

    Most importantly, if the May 2021 order is purportedly in the interests of refugee protection, then it is time to consider the adoption of a non-discriminatory and inclusive refugee policy in consonance with India’s constitutional values.

You can find the note here:Download

Section 6A and Assam

parichayteam1 Comment

The Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School is currently offering the year-long Clinic on Citizenship and Statelessness, where students are developing research outputs on citizenship issues in India and assessing the citizenship determination framework under international law. This research note, prepared by Samia Khan, is part of the clinic’s outcomes.

In the year 1950, the Immigrant (Expulsion from Assam) Act was passed by the Parliament. The objects and purpose of the Act read: “During the last few months a serious situation had arisen from the immigration of a very large number of East Bengal residents into Assam. Such large migration is disturbing the economy of the province besides giving rise to a serious law and order problem” (see here). While the Act allowed the Central Government to give “directions in regard to” the removal of individuals from Assam, the application of the Act was barred against individuals who “on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances in any area” of Pakistan had been “displaced” or left their residence. While this Act marked the beginning of issues concerning migration, these issues came into the limelight with the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, which led to a widespread migration from Bangladesh to Assam. 

The subsequent enfranchisement of refugees/migrants prompted the All Assam Students Union (AASU) to spearhead an “anti-foreigner” agitation in 1979, demanding “detection, disenfranchisement and deportation” of foreigners. Despite this agitation and resistance, Indira Gandhi’s government called for assembly elections in Assam in February 1983. While the AASU demanded for a boycott of elections, sections of Bengali Muslims decided to vote nonetheless in order to “effectively prove their claim to Indian citizenship”. These tensions culminated in the Nellie massacre which claimed around 1800 people according to official records, most of whom were Bengali Muslims. In the aftermath of Nellie, two legal developments followed. First, in 1985, a political settlement was reached between the agitators and the Central and State Governments, named the Assam Accord. Introduced through an amendment, Section 6A of the Citizenship Act was a legislative enactment for furthering the terms of this accord. Under Section 6A, any person who entered Assam from Bangladesh before the 1st of January, 1966 will be deemed a citizen of India. Persons who settled in the state between January 2, 1966 and March 24, 1971 would have to register themselves according to the rules laid down by the Central Government and would enjoy all other rights except the right to vote for a ten-year period. (see here) At the lapse of the ten-year period, they would become eligible to be enrolled in the electoral rolls. Finally, all those who migrated after the aforementioned date were to be expelled. 

The second important development happened two years before the Assam Accord, wherein Parliament passed the  Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals Act) of 1983. Read with Illegal Migrant Rules of 1984, these two would act in conjunction to “detect and deport” foreigners by Tribunals established under this Act. The IMDT Act allowed for complaints to be brought to the police by a person living within a 3 kilometer radius of the foreigner suspected to have entered India without the necessary travel documents. It also placed the burden of proof on the State and the complainant, to establish the person’s status as “illegal migrant”. However, the Act was challenged by Sarbananda Sonowal before the Supreme Court. 

In pronouncing the judgement, the Court relied upon a report by the Governor of Assam, S.K. Sinha which claimed that, “Muslim militant organisations [had] mushroomed in Assam” as a result of illegal migration from Bangladesh. While Governor Sinha’s report was not backed by any data or surveys, the Court nonetheless held that there was an “external aggression” against the State of Assam. Subsequently, invoking Article 355 of the Constitution, the Court held that IMDT’s placement of burdens was insufficient to check the issues laid down in Sinha’s report, and hence went on to hold the Act and the Rules unconstitutional. After Sarbananda Sonowal, the regime, rather than being governed by IMDT, returned to Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, the Foreigners Act, and the Foreigners Tribunal Order.

Section 6A and the Assam Accord are often seen as the “genesis of the updated NRC in Assam”. Section 6A is instrumental in the creation of the National Register of Citizens (‘NRC’) in Assam, which is currently being updated under the supervision of the Supreme Court. The process requires a person to prove their Indian citizenship by providing government documents that establish their family legacy and their right to reside in India. This tedious process is often impossible for persons with limited resources, resulting in them being left off the NRC and stripped of the protection offered by citizenship.

It is in this context that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act was challenged before the Supreme Court in a petition by a Guwahati-based civil society organisation, Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha (ASM) in 2012. While referring the case to a bigger bench, Justice Nariman framed thirteen questions of law. 

While a five-judge constitution bench was instituted by Chief Justice J.S. Khehar in 2017 which conducted two hearings, it was decided to reconstitute a fresh bench later. Subsequently, as the question still remains unanswered, it is evident that the lack of clarity has resulted in a lack of clarity about applicable legal standards for citizenship determination in Assam. There is an imminent need for the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of the Section. Delaying the ruling will only be harmful to the lives of thousands whose citizenship hangs in the balance.

Suggested Reading Material :-

  1. Anupama Roy, Mapping Citizenship in India (Oxford University Press 2010) ch 2.
  2. Abdul Kalam Azad, M. Mohsin Alam Bhat and Harsh Mander, ‘Citizenship and the Mass Production of Statelessness in Assam’, India Exclusion Report 2019-2020 http://centreforequitystudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/India-Exclusion-Report-2019-20-e-copy.pdf accessed 16 June 2021.
  3. Ashna Ashesh and Arun Thiruvengadam, ‘Report on Citizenship Law: India’, GlobalCit Country Report July 2017 https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/47124/GLOBALCIT_CR_2017_12.pdf?sequence=1 accessed 16 June 2021.
  4. Niraja Gopala Jayal, ‘Citizenship’ in Sujit Choudhary, Madhav Khosla, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press 2016).

Refugees

parichayteamLeave a comment

The Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School is currently offering the year-long Clinic on Citizenship and Statelessness, where students are developing research outputs on citizenship issues in India and assessing the citizenship determination framework under international law. This research note, prepared by Soumyajit Joardar, is part of the clinic’s outcomes.

Introduction: The Refugee Convention of 1951

The term ‘refugee’ refers to people who are forced to flee their country due to the threat of persecution. The first refugees were white protestants who had to flee France due to religious persecution in 17th century Europe. However, the concept garnered further interest only in the aftermath of World War II. Subsequently, in 1950, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was instituted to safeguard the interests of the Europeans displaced during the conflict period.

The Refugee Convention 1951 defines ‘refugee’ as a person who is unable or unwilling to avail the protection of their country of nationality and is residing outside their country due to the fear of prosecution based on factors such as race and religion or membership of any other social group. Article 33 of the Convention, through the principle of non-refoulement, has forbidden nations from returning refugees to the country where they would face the threat of persecution. Article 31 prevents States from penalising refugees for illegal entry until they present themselves to the authorities and show cause. Article 32 of the Convention protects expulsion of refugees except on grounds of national security or public order in accordance with due process.

In 1967, an additional Protocol was enacted to further safeguard the interests of the refugees. It removed the temporal and geographic limitations of the 1951 Convention. While India is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, it is bound by certain principles of the Convention, such as non-refoulment, as they have become customary international law.

India’s International and Constitutional Law Obligations Towards Refugees

India is also a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1963. Hence, India is obligated to protect and preserve the rights of the refugees by virtue of principles such as non-refoulement and in light of its other civil rights related obligations under the ICCPR, ICESCR and the CERD.

India’s Treatment of Refugees: An Overview

India’s experience with Refugees began in the aftermath of the partition, when it dealt with mass inflow from Pakistan (and vice-versa) due to religious persecution. Nonetheless, in the years since then, India has not adopted a uniform policy on the issue. Instead, the treatment refugees receive depends on their country of origin.

The government has taken active steps to cater to the refugees from Tibet and Tamils from Sri Lanka. The Ministry of Home Affairs has categorically stated that India refers to only Sri Lankan Tamils and Tibetans as refugees and has specifically aided the Tibetans in multi-dimensional ways. The Tibetans have been provided land for settlement in Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand in addition to access to education, health care and welfare of their community interests. The Sri Lankan refugees, however, have not received the attention of the government. They find themselves languishing in camps in Tamil Nadu. These camps lack basic facilities such as sanitation and security. However, groups like the Chakmas or the Rohingyas are not treated like the Tibetans or Sri Lankan Tamils. Instead, India has been lackadaisical in providing basic facilities to the Chakma and Hajong refugees.    

Refugees from Myanmar have been treated differently and have been referred to UNHCR by the government. The role of the UNHCR is to preserve the interest of refugees and asylum seekers not protected by the Government of India. The UNHCR currently hosts 40,859 refugees and asylum seekers. Once determined by UNHCR as refugees, the individuals receive refugee cards which allow them access to education in government schools and free medical treatment in government hospitals. It also acts as a guarantee against forced deportation.

Having been surrounded by countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar, India is in a unique position to take into account cultural interests of its neighbours alongside demographical considerations. However, the usual responses from India are limited to resources and infrastructure as a hindrance to accept refugees. There has been a resounding political consensus on this issue.

The Ministry of Home Affairs has taken a consistent position regarding the refusal of rights to the refugees to settle in the country. There has been a persistent understanding that the refugees are a burden on the taxpayers of the country. However, the fact that the refugees contribute significantly to the country’s economy is overlooked. Unfortunately, public discourse around India’s failure to fulfil its international law obligations towards Refugees is minimal. The status quo of non-uniformity reigns the landscape.

Suggested Readings:

  1. P Oberoi. (2001) “South Asia and the Creation of the International Refugee Regime” Refuge, available at https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/21228/19899.  
  2. BS Chimni (2000) ‘Legal Conditions of Refugees in India’ in International Refugee Law: A Reader.  
  3. Refugees Defined and Described in The Refugee in International Law (3rd Edition) Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Jane McAdam, OUP.
  4. CITIZEN REFUGEE: FORGING THE INDIAN NATION AFTER PARTITION by Uditi Sen.
  5. Responding to protracted refugee situations: Lessons from a decade of discussion (FORCED MIGRATION POLICY BRIEFING 6) by Dr James Milner and Professor Gil Loescher.
  6. The long partition and the making of modern South Asia (2010), New York: Columbia University Press.
  7. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2018-19. https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_English_01102019.pdf.
  8. UNHCR Fact Sheet on India 2020. https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20India%20fact%20sheet%2031%20December%202020.pdf. 

Foreigners’ Tribunals

parichayteam2 Comments

The Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School is currently offering the year-long Clinic on Citizenship and Statelessness, where students are developing research outputs on citizenship issues in India and assessing the citizenship determination framework under international law. This research note, prepared by Shuchi Purohit, is part of the clinic’s outcomes.

Foreigners’ Tribunals are quasi-judicial bodies set up by the Central Government to determine whether a person is a foreigner or not under the Foreigners’ (Tribunals) Order, 1964, created under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Executive appoints judicial members to adjudicate cases before FTs. These tribunals differ from other tribunals or courts of law in India in terms of procedure, selection criteria of judicial members, examination of evidence, absence of an appellate body, etc. Presently, as many as 1.4 lakh cases of suspected foreigners are pending before 300 tribunals functioning in Assam. 

History and Establishment of Foreigners’ Tribunals

The primary aim behind setting up foreigners’ tribunals was to avoid arbitrary deportation. The Foreigners Act was first enacted in 1864, to limit the mobility of groups that the colonial British government saw as “disorderly or alien.” The Foreigner’s Act, 1946, which was adopted by independent India, incorporated this objective as well, in a situation where borders were porous and in flux, especially along the eastern borders. However, the Foreigners Act did not incorporate any mechanism for the identification and detection of foreigners. 

The 1961 Census Report focused on preparing data on irregular immigrants. 2,20,691 ‘infiltrants’ were found in Assam due to migration from East Pakistan. The Border police thereafter misused this data as they started detecting and deporting foreigners without any judicial process. The Ministry of Home Affairs then, through powers granted under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, passed the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964, so that no person would be deported without a hearing. 

In 1983, the Government of India passed the Illegal Migrant (Determination by the Tribunal) Act, 1983 (‘IMDT Act’). The objective of this Act was to determine foreigners who entered India after 25 March 1971, according to Section 6A of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 1986. Such individuals were ineligible to obtain Indian citizenship and were detected and deported in accordance with the IMDT Act. The IMDT Act differed significantly from the Foreigners Order in one respect: it placed the burden of proof for demonstrating that the individual is a foreigner upon the state. It also defined the eligibility criteria to be a judicial member of the tribunal. An option of the review was available in case a difference of opinion arose among the judicial members.

However, there was growing turmoil in Assam as the leaders of Assam Agitation believed that the IMDT Act was unsuccessful in detecting and expelling foreigners and the issue of irregular immigration remained unresolved. Hence, in 2005, in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court declared the IMDT Act as unconstitutional, as it found the procedure laid down in the Act to be “time-consuming”. The Court cited two reasons for its decision. First, that the Act failed to protect the people of Assam from external aggression by the migrants, which is the prerogative of the central government. Second, that in order to uphold national security, there was a need for identification of these foreigners to expedite their deportation. The Court struck down the IMDT Act as unconstitutional, and reverted to the Tribunal regime established under the Foreigners Act and Order, thus shifting the burden of proof to the individual suspected to be a foreigner. 

How do Foreigners’ Tribunals receive Cases?

There are three modes through which the Foreigners’ Tribunals receive cases: references from the Border Police, the Election Commission of India, and the National Register of Citizens. There are presently 1.9 million people who are excluded from the final draft of the NRC, waiting for their fate to be decided, as the process for their claim to citizenship before FT is yet to be started. 

Almost every district in Assam has Assam Police Border personnel stationed, who identify and investigate alleged foreigners based on their discretion. Cases identified by the Border Police are referred to FTs for final adjudication. However, civil society organisations argue that this power is often abused by the Border Police as they do not follow any investigatory guidelines to identify alleged foreigners, as laid down by the Gauhati High Court. 

Individuals can also be identified as foreigners by the Election Commission. In 1997, the ECI had identified around 2,30,000 voters as ‘doubtful,’ whose cases were then referred to FTs for adjudication. 

Finally, the National Register of Citizens in Assam is an exercise identifying all Indian citizens in the state. Individuals excluded from the list are identified as foreigners, who will have to prove their citizenship before FTs. In 2019, the final NRC list was released, which excluded around 19 lakh people from citizenship. In May 2021, the NRC Coordinator had filed an application before the Supreme Court seeking re-verification of the NRC, stating that some ‘issues of substantive importance’ cropped up while preparing the rejecting slips, thus delaying the process.

Lapses of Foreigners’ Tribunals in India

India is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and is hence bound by its treaty obligations. Article 14(1) of ICCPR states that every person is entitled to a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” The Foreigners Act falls short on each criterion set by ICCPR, as it fails to establish standardised criteria of eligibility for its members. 

Scholars and civil society organisations have raised concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of these tribunals. The appointed members of the Foreigners’ Tribunal do not have any specialized training in law or adjudication. This is evidenced by the Gauhati High Court’s circular seeking to appoint senior civil servants as members of the Foreigners’ Tribunal, as opposed to persons having prior adjudicatory or legal experience. Moreover, membership with the Tribunal is renewed or terminated depending on the conviction rate. Thus, members of the Foreigners’ Tribunal would be incentivised to declare more people as foreigners, to retain their seats. This leads to an inherent conflict of interest, which falls short of the requirement of impartiality.

The Act also fails to state the training a member needs to carry out the judicial duties, thus compromising the requirement of competency. In 2015, the training received by the 63 selected members spanned merely four days. Out of those, only two were former or serving judicial officers. Moreover, the Government of Assam has further lowered the threshold of experience required from 10 years to 7 years. The age limit of induction which was previously 45 years, is now 35.

The tribunals are empowered to regulate their own procedures, as provided by the 1964 Order. Civil society organisations have noted that in practice, this power is abused and the tribunals do not provide documents such as written statements, witness depositions, etc., which are necessary for an individual to fairly contest and appeal their case. More than 60% of cases are decided ex-parte, as most individuals do not receive show-cause notices. The Gauhati High Court had stated that since Foreigners’ Tribunals are not civil but rather quasi-judicial bodies, the principle of res judicata does not apply. However, the Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus v. Union Of India, later overturned this ratio, finding instead that quasi-judicial orders rendered by Foreigners’ Tribunals have civil consequences. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata would apply. Further, the orders passed by Foreigners’ Tribunals cannot easily be found in the public realm, making the entire process opaque.

The Foreigners Act and Order do not provide for a right to appeal against the decision of a Foreigners’ Tribunal and set up no appellate body. All appeals have to be made to the High Court and Supreme Court. There are various factors such as litigating costs, locations, the prolonged duration of appeals etc. which act as barriers to individuals approaching appellate courts for a review of their decision. Even if they wish to do so, this right has become judicially restricted through the decision of the State of Assam v. Moslem Mandal. The decision states that the tribunal is the final fact-finding body, post which facts cannot be challenged during the appeal. However, facts are the most important aspect of such cases. Lawyers practising in FTs note an alarming difference between the prescribed methods for fact-finding and how facts are actually obtained by the Border Police. The guidelines laid in Moslem Mandal propounded that the referring authority must forward their observations recording their satisfaction in such a manner that demonstrates their application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case; however, the fact-collection procedure is largely ignored. 

Conclusion

The objective of the 1946 Act was to deport legitimate foreigners in the Indian territory, rather than to determine the citizenship status of the masses to declare them foreigners. The functioning of these tribunals fails to take into consideration the grave risks associated with statelessness. It forces targeted individuals to live in limbo with constant anxiety over their civil and political rights. 

Suggested readings

  1. Amnesty International India, ‘Designed To Exclude: How India’s Courts Are Allowing Foreigner Tribunals To Render People Stateless In Assam,’ (2019) <https://www.amnesty.be/IMG/pdf/rapport_inde.pdf>.
  2. Talha Abdul Rahman, ‘Identifying the Outsider: An Assessment of Foreigner Tribunals in the Indian State of Assam’ VOL 2 NO 1 (2020): STATELESSNESS & CITIZENSHIP REVIEW <https://statelessnessandcitizenshipreview.com/index.php/journal/article/view/141>. 
  3. Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, ‘Explainer: What Do the MHA’s Changes to 1964 Foreigners Tribunals Order Mean?’ (The Wire, 14 June 2019) <https://thewire.in/government/foreigners-tribunals-order-mha-changes> 
  4. State of Assam v. Moslem Mandal and Ors. (2013) 3 Gau LR 402.
  5. Mohsin Alam Bhat, ‘Twilight Citizenship’ (2020) 729 Seminar <https://www.india-seminar.com/2020/729/729_m_mohsin_alam_bhat.htm>. 
  6. Citizens Against Hate, ‘Making Foreigner: Report on NRC Updation in Assam and the Risk of Mass Statelessness’ (2018) <https://citizensagainsthate.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Making-Foreigner.pdf> 

Deportation and Detention

parichayteamLeave a comment

The Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School is currently offering the year-long Clinic on Citizenship and Statelessness, where students are developing research outputs on citizenship issues in India and assessing the citizenship determination framework under international law. This research note, prepared by Andolan Sarkar, is part of the clinic’s outcomes.

A foreigner as defined in Section 2(a) of the Foreigners Act of 1946 (‘the Act’) means a person who is not a citizen of India.[1] The ambit of this act extends to stipulating the deportation or detention of such foreigners. The definition of a foreigner within the Act, however, is vague since it negates the distinction between refugees, illegal migrants, and asylum seekers.

Deportation entails the expulsion of a foreigner from their current resident country to their country of origin or any other third country by any lawful authority on grounds authorised by law. While detention entails the lawful confinement of any individual, such confinement must be prescribed by any statute and sanctioned by the Court. The relevance of this discussion hinges on the several petitions challenging deportation orders and  thousands of individuals being detained in detention centres in dingy conditions for prolonged periods without a fair trial.

The authority of the Indian State to deport arises from Section 3 of the Act which allows the State to make orders restricting the stay of “foreigners” within Indian territory. Threat to national security, illegal entry into the country, commission of crimes by foreigners, residence within the country after the expiration of visa, violation of visa conditions, and nationality under question are some of the grounds on which the State has previously administered deportation orders.

In Assam, in particular, vide Notification No. 1/7/61–F.III dated the 22nd March 1961, the authority of the state to adjudge individuals as foreigners under clauses (c) and (cc) of Sub–section (2) of Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, was extended to the Superintendent of Police and Deputy Commissioners under the Govt. of Assam. This was followed by the entrustment of such a power by the President vide Notification No. 14011/13/75-F.III dated 17.02.1976 by virtue of under clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution. This was however, subject to the various conditions.[2] The power of issuing orders for detention, however, was not entrusted and yet has been exercised wherein movement of foreigners is being curtailed and they are being placed in foreigner wards in jails or detention centres. This is in conformity with the Madras High Court judgement dated 21.09.2007 in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1138 of 2006 titled Latha v. Public Department and Innocent v. State of Goa(which later reaffirmed this judgement)wherein it was deemed permissible for the state government to act under delegated powers under Section 3(2)(e) in keeping a foreigner in a detention camp.

Since there is immense administrative control without any definitive statutory grounds based on which deportation can take place, the State has often tried to pass arbitrary orders. For instance, in Kamil Siedczynski,[3] the State issued a Leave India Notice to a Polish student studying in West Bengal for participating in a protest against a new Indian legislation. The Court held such an order to be null and void, since it was arbitrary and without any reason. The Court held that the student was on a valid visa, and merely protesting against the State does not warrant a deportation.

Additionally, The State does not enjoy unfettered discretion to expel any foreigner. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution allows for the deprivation of life and liberty only on the basis of procedure established by law. The deportation of any foreigner must be in compliance with Article 21 and other international principles. A deportation order must be assessed by the courts to be just, fair, and reasonable as interpreted by Article 21.[4] A deportation order restricting the stay of a foreigner must also be proportionate to the end goal that it seeks to achieve.

Few principles in domestic and international law act as safeguards against the deportation of foreigners. For instance, Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention talks about non-refoulement, which means that no State can send foreigners back to the place where they may face the risk of persecution. India has often argued that it has no obligation to comply with the non-refoulement principle since it is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, India must abide by the non-refoulement principle while deporting foreigners as the principle has evolved to be a part of the customary international law and is embedded in several other international instruments to which India is a signatory.

Deportation and detention run hand in hand. Section 3(2)(g) of the Act empowers the State to make orders in relation to the arrest and detention of foreigners. Foreigners awaiting deportation, individuals who do not possess documents, or foreigners whose nationality cannot be determined are kept under detention. Detention is justified by the State on grounds that Article 19 is not applicable to foreigners.[5]

Furthermore, the actions of the government actors flout procedure when detaining individuals under the pretence of them being foreigners. As per Section 4(2) of the Act, every officer making an arrest under Section 4 shall, without unnecessary delay, take or send the person arrested before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or to the officer in charge of the nearest police-station and the provisions of Section 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (5 of 1898) shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of any such arrest. The same is not undertaken in the initiation of proceedings or competition of proceedings before the FTs.

Foreigners are detained for prolonged time periods due to lack of proper deportation procedures. Deportation can only take place when the receiving country is willing to accept the alleged foreigner. In several cases, foreigners are detained indefinitely as no other countries are willing to accept them. Many alleged foreigners claim to be Indian citizens, but are not able to challenge the decision of Foreigners’ Tribunals. This implies that several Indian citizens may have been wrongfully termed as foreigners and in the absence of any challenges, they still remain under wrongful detention. This runs contrary to the principles enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR by virtue of which every individual, irrespective of their nationality, deserves a fair trial and has a right to approach the courts.[6]

It is to be noted that the power of detention enshrined in Section 3(2)(g) and Section 4 were deleted from the Foreigners Act vide the Foreigners Amendment Act, 1957 after the then Attorney General of India, Mr. MC Setalvad, conceded to its lack of compliance with Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution in the case of Hans Muller of Nuremberg v. Supdt. Presidency Jail, Calcutta, (1955) 1 SCR 1284. Such power was reintroduced by virtue of an amendment in 1962 in light of the war with China. It was via an amendment in 2013, that this power was addressed in Paragraph 3 of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964.

Additionally, courts have looked down upon indefinite detention, since it runs contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.[7] In Hussainara Khatoon,[8] the Court spoke about pre-trial detention and stated that “a procedure which keeps such large numbers of people behind bars without trial for so long cannot possibly be regarded as ‘reasonable, just or fair’”. Additionally, the courts, in the case of State of Assam v. Moslem Mandal, (2013) 3 GLR 402stated that there is a limitation of 2 months for the duration of how long a foreigner may be detained.

The detention of foreigners is administrative in nature. These foreigners have not committed any penal offence; therefore, they are placed in detention centres awaiting deportation. Even if convicted of a penal offence, they are placed there after completing their sentence. Foreigners in detention centres must be treated with dignity. Unfortunately, the condition of these detention-centres is highly appalling as they fail to provide the detainees with proper food, water, hygiene, healthcare and other basic facilities.[9] This runs contrary to the hearing in Santanu Borthakur v. Union of India, tagged with W.P. (Crl) 7/2020 titled Abantee Dutta v. Union of India.The courts, vide Order 07.10.2020, observed that foreigners could not be held in jails and that the detention centres created by state government is in compliance with the standards stipulated by the central government.

The Act, first, ought to make a clear distinction between all categories of non-citizens. Further,  it needs to mention definitive grounds based on which deportation can take place. In the absence of such grounds, the administration enjoys too much leeway in administering deportation orders. Most importantly, alleged foreigners cannot be made to live in inhuman conditions within these detention-centres for an indefinite time period. Foreigners ought to be governed by a regime of rights, where they are granted all the necessary facilities within the detention-centres. A foreigner enjoys all rights as mentioned under Article 21. The government and the local-administration should be the first points to ensure the well-being of all foreigners.    

SUGGESTED READINGS:

Deprivation of Citizenship

parichayteamLeave a comment

The Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School is currently offering the year-long Clinic on Citizenship and Statelessness, where students are developing research outputs on citizenship issues in India and assessing the citizenship determination framework under international law. This research note, prepared by Khush Aalam Singh, is part of the clinic’s outcomes.

Deprivation of citizenship can be defined as an involuntary loss of citizenship status that was previously held by a person. It is a predominantly legal concept which carries serious consequences. This is because citizenship of a state gives a person access to several rights and protections guaranteed by the state. Acquiring citizenship carries a sense of recognition in social, political, and legal terms. Citizenship also provides access to the conditions and services which are vital for a person’s dignified existence. If a person is deprived of their citizenship, they no longer have a claim to its benefits. This can also get carried forward to the person’s descendants, impacting their access to rights. Additionally, citizenship deprivation may result in the removal of the person from the territory of the state, thereby violating their right to reside in their country.

The idea of deprivation of citizenship has been echoed in various similar expressions. These include terms such as: revocation of citizenship, involuntary loss of citizenship, denationalisation, citizenship erasure etc. While revocation, denationalisation, and involuntary loss do not carry substantial difference from deprivation, citizenship erasure is a concept that requires further classification. Citizenship erasure is described as the “arbitrary retroactive non-recognition” of citizenship of a person. This has been considered distinct from deprivation as it denies the very existence of citizenship status claimed by a person outright, whereas deprivation is carried out in accordance with law. In other words, deprivation takes place in accordance with deprivation provisions contained in a state’s citizenship law, whereas erasure does not involve the formal procedure. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this note, citizenship erasure falls within the ambit of deprivation, as the consequence is the loss of nationality which was not voluntary in nature. In many situations, deprivation of nationality can result in a person becoming stateless. This may leave them vulnerable to human rights violations without any effective recourse.

Deprivation of Citizenship in Domestic and International Law

Under Indian law, the principal framework for deprivation of nationality is the Citizenship Act, 1955 as well as the rules made thereunder. Section 10(2) of the Act empowers the Central Government to deprive a person of their citizenship. This power to deprive citizenship, however, applies only in the case of persons who have acquired citizenship by naturalisation, registration or by ordinary residence in Indian territory five years prior to the commencement of the Constitution. This means that persons who are born in Indian territory or to parents who are Indian citizens cannot be deprived of their citizenship under this provision (jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship).

Deprivation of citizenship under Section 10 of the Act can only be ordered on specific grounds. The implication of these grounds is that the state cannot arbitrarily deprive persons of their citizenship. The grounds set out in Section 10 must be adhered to. These include (among others) – obtaining citizenship by fraud, disloyalty or disaffection by act or speech to the Indian Constitution, unlawful trade or communication with an enemy, etc. Section 10(3) provides that the Central Government shall not deprive a person of their citizenship unless it is satisfied that the continuation of citizenship is not conducive to the public good. The Telangana High Court in Dr. Ramesh Chenammameni v. Union of India has held that the requirement under Section 10(3) is mandatory, and that a person cannot be deprived solely on the ground of satisfying the conditions under Section 10(3). The Central Government has to satisfy both counts – that the person in question has violated the provisions of Section 10(2) and that the continuation of citizenship is not conducive to the public good.

The principal framework under international law dealing with deprivation of citizenship is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Article 8 of the Convention prohibits depriving a person of their nationality where the result of such action would be the person becoming stateless. Clauses 2 and 3 of the Article contain exceptions to this prohibition, which include obtaining nationality of the Contracting State by fraud or misrepresentation, conduct that is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the state etc. Article 9 of the Convention prohibits deprivation of nationality of a person or a group of persons on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds. While India is not a signatory to this Convention, its courts have been mindful of statelessness as a consequence of deprivation of citizenship.

Additionally, India is obliged under its treaty obligations to prevent statelessness as a consequence of deprivation of nationality. It is also obliged to ensure that no person is arbitrarily deprived of their nationality. Article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) prohibits arbitrary deprivation of nationality. This prohibition has now been recognised as a well-established norm of customary international law. Furthermore, India had a vital role to play in advocating for the insertion of Article 15(2) during the drafting of the UDHR.

The Right against Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality

The right against arbitrary deprivation of nationality finds mention in the UDHR and several international conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) etc. This is supplemented by its inclusion in regional frameworks, such as the American Convention of Human Rights (Article 20). This right is of crucial importance when looking at instances of deprivation of citizenship. This is because this right covers two situations of deprivation. Deprivation can be a result of the procedure established in municipal law or by discriminatory refusal to recognise a person or group of persons as citizens. The understanding of arbitrariness under international law is not limited to something being ‘against the law’. It has been understood in a broader sense, encompassing elements of unfairness, inappropriateness and injustice. Arbitrariness also seeks to ensure that ‘lawful’ interference with rights of a person is reasonable. This requires robust substantive and procedural safeguards, as well as conformity to both domestic and international law.

There are several aspects of citizenship deprivation in India that remain unaddressed, raising strong concerns about arbitrariness. Several bonafide Indian citizens face the threat of arbitrary deprivation of their nationality as a result of the process of expelling ‘foreigners’. In particular, over 1.9 million persons in Assam excluded from the National Register of Citizens (NRC) are at the brink of statelessness. Their fate will be decided by the Foreigners Tribunals which raise many significant due process concerns. The current policy on deprivation does not account for deprivation of citizenship through parallel procedures sanctioned by law. Furthermore, there are several inadequacies in terms of substantive and procedural rights for persons being deprived of their citizenship. As a result of wrongful deprivation, a person will languish in detention for the purpose of deportation. These consequences are particularly grave and debilitating, therefore requiring extreme caution and respect for human dignity. Thus, citizenship deprivation calls for greater attention as an urgent issue that needs to be addressed.

Suggested Readings:

Naturalisation

parichayteamLeave a comment

The Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School is currently offering the year-long Clinic on Citizenship and Statelessness, where the students are developing research outputs on citizenship issues in India and assessing the citizenship determination framework under international law. This research note, prepared by Pritha Paul, is part of the clinic’s outcomes.

Naturalisation refers to the incorporation of migrants usually displaced due to economic, political, or environmental reasons, among others, or immigrants looking for better living conditions or educational and employment prospects in the state they move to. It is a process promising not only recognition of their socio-economic contributions but also improved socio-economic opportunities. Historically, the word ‘naturalisation’ is derived from Middle French ‘naturaliser’ which means “to admit (an alien) to rights of a citizen”.

Jus soli was the guiding principle of the eighteenth century feudal European citizenship until the French Revolution reintroduced the Roman jus sanguinis principle. Both proved inadequate when the two World Wars left numerous migrants, refugees, and stateless persons in foreign lands without protection under the laws of that state. Naturalisation provided an opportunity to people, who were neither born within a State nor had ancestral ties to it, to become citizens solely by virtue of their personal connection formed with the State. Such connections could be established through residence, intention to settle, or a lack of ties to other countries. However, most states hold elaborate and intrusive tests to scrutinise this connection. For instance, Denmark has prescribed housing, residence, employment, language, and lifestyle requirements.

In India, naturalisation is one of the five ways in which one may become an Indian citizen, governed by section 6 of the Citizenship Act of 1955. To be eligible for naturalisation, one must be of good character, reside in India for a period of eleven years, and speak any of the official Indian languages. Upon being granted Indian citizenship, one must renounce any prevailing citizenship, take an oath of allegiance, and reside in or serve India. Initially, one had to renounce one’s existing citizenship upon applying for naturalisation. This had the potential to render one temporarily or permanently stateless depending on the approval or rejection of the application, respectively. Hence, the change is appreciable. However, in a lower-middle income country like India, an application fee of Rs. 1500 and requirement of language proficiency create invisible barriers for poor and illiterate migrants. Contrarily, the privileged who have a symbiotic relationship with the state are overindulged. The state may waive any or all naturalisation requirements for “distinguished” persons. Proficiency in a local language can propel social and economic integration. However, in their home state, persecuted persons are often systematically denied education and employment. In the host state, they are put in isolated squalid detention camps without basic facilities as has been seen in the case of Rohingyas. Even when free to live in the community, they are compelled to settle in the peripheries, like the Afghans in Delhi. For such people, it is nearly impossible to fulfil the naturalisation requirements.

Naturalisation tests ensure not only a low number of naturalised persons but also fewer applicants out of fear of failure, which perhaps is the primary aim of the tests. Between 2011 and 2020, merely 1380 foreigners were granted Indian citizenship through naturalisation. Moreover, the Act, through the 2003 amendment, made “illegal migrants” completely ineligible for Indian citizenship through registration or naturalisation. The unwillingness of the State to incorporate migrants leaves them in a limbo. Most of them cannot be deported due to the principle of non-refoulement. They remain in India for the rest of their lives, but as non-citizens.

Section 6, however, is not applicable to the state of Assam, which is governed by section 6A of the Act. Unlike Section 6, which applies to all persons regardless of their origin, Sections 6A and 6B create special pathways to citizenship for persons migrating from Bangladesh. It ‘regularizes’ i.e. grants immediate citizenship to those who entered Assam from Bangladesh before 1966. Persons who entered between 1966 and 1971 are conferred all qualities of a citizen except the right to vote until ten years from the day of their detection as a “foreigner.” After ten years, they too are regularised. Those who were expelled but managed to re-enter illegally before 1971 or those who entered after 1971 are to be deported. This special provision created two artificial distinctions by:

  1. Granting regularisation to Bangladeshi migrants who entered Assam before 1971 but not to those who entered other bordering states,
  2. Allowing “illegal migrants” who entered India before 2003 to naturalise under Section 6 but not those who entered Assam after 1971.

Additionally, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 2019, excludes non-Muslims who entered India from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh before 2015 from the category of “illegal migrants.” It eases their residency requirement from eleven years to five years. The ease is a welcome move. However, the country and religion based classifications are non-secular, arbitrary, and unreasonable.  Many have argued that they violate the Indian Constitution which guarantees certain fundamental rights to all persons irrespective of their citizenship status.

A state cannot be compelled to grant citizenship. However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 includes in Article 15, “Everyone has the right to a nationality”. The UDHR has become customary international law binding on all states. Granting nationality through naturalisation is an important step in eliminating statelessness. Since India has an obligation towards reducing statelessness under customary international law and other international treaties, India must facilitate naturalisation of stateless persons. A provision obstructing “illegal migrants” from naturalisation is in tension with international law. Articles 31 and 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 32 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons instruct easing the naturalisation process for refugees and stateless persons. Ireland has reduced residency requirements for refugees and waived naturalisation certificate fee for refugees and stateless persons.

As a good practice, one may refer to Prabhleen Kaur v. Union Of India. The only country the petitioner had any real connection to under Section 8 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 was India. Denying her Indian citizenship was held a violation of Article 15 of the UDHR. The court stated that her good character evidenced in her school and college certificates, her knowledge of the nation and her being a part of a community entitle her to be naturalised under Section 6(1) of the Act and she cannot be denied citizenship.These are the factors generally looked at while granting Indian citizenship.

With the refugee crisis and statelessness becoming global phenomena, naturalisation is becoming increasingly important as a means for non-citizens to find a safe space and a community in a strange land. Ironically, the process does exactly the opposite of what it promises, acting as a constant reminder of the ‘otherness’ that one must shed for a mere chance at approval and acceptance. India must remove the restriction on “illegal migrants” and ease the naturalisation requirements for refugees and stateless persons, irrespective of religion and country. This would only be a small step towards ensuring equity and fairness.

Suggested readings:

  1. Katherine Tonkiss, ‘What’s So Bad about Citizenship Testing?’ (E-International Relations, 28 November 2014) https://www.e-ir.info/2014/11/28/whats-so-bad-about-citizenship-testing/ accessed 24 November.
  1. Oded Löwenheim & Orit Gazit, ‘Power and Examination: A Critique of Citizenship Tests’ (2009) 40(2) Security Dialogue.
  1. Albert Kraler, Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation (Amsterdam University Press 2006) ch 2.
  1. Pritam Baruah, ‘Not Just Equality, the CAA Betrays Constitutional Values of Dignity, Integrity’ The Wire (27 December 2019) https://thewire.in/rights/caa-constitution-equality accessed 24 November 2020.
  1. Vatsal Raj, ‘Statelessness in India – Seeking Solutions in International Law’ (Cambridge International Law Journal, 11 February 2020) http://cilj.co.uk/2020/02/11/statelessness-in-india-seeking-solutions-in-international-law/#:~:text=Migration%20is%20a%20phenomenon%20of%20human%20civilisation.&text=The%20solution%20lies%20in%20the,dictate%20the%20laws%20of%20citizenship accessed 24 November 2020.
  1. Asha Bangar, ‘Statelessness in India’ (2017) Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2017/02 https://files.institutesi.org/WP2017_02.pdf accessed 24 November 2020.
  1. Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Oxford University Press 2017) ch 16.
  1. Graziella Bertocchi and Chiara Strozzi, ‘The Evolution of Citizenship: Economic and Institutional Determinants’ (2006) IZA Discussion Paper No. 2510 http://ftp.iza.org/dp2510.pdf accessed 24 November 2020.
  1. Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘Procedure For Applying Online For Indian Citizenship’ https://indiancitizenshiponline.nic.in/Ic_GeneralInstruction.pdf accessed 24 November 2020.

Stateless Persons

parichayteamLeave a comment

The Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School is currently offering the year-long Clinic on Citizenship and Statelessness, where students are developing research outputs on citizenship issues in India and assessing the citizenship determination framework under international law. This research note, prepared by Niharika Jain, is part of the clinic’s outcomes.

A person is considered to be stateless if they are not recognised as nationals or citizens of any country. As per the UNHCR, at present there exist over 10 million stateless persons in the world, however only 3.9 million of them are accounted for. Civil society organisations have pointed out that this number can be as high as 15 million. In India, over 1.9 million people are facing the risk of statelessness after being excluded from the National Register of Citizens (NRC) implemented in Assam in 2019.

Statelessness is often a result of conflicting nationality laws, where one allows for nationality to be acquired at birth and the other through descent if one’s parent is also a national. It can also be a result of discrimination in nationality laws based on factors such as religion, ethnicity, gender, along with instances where the State arbitrarily deprives persons of their nationality, as in the case of Assam. Earlier the mandate of UNHCR on statelessness extended only to stateless persons who were refugees. However, it is now known that even though some stateless persons are refugees, many stateless persons never cross an international border. Statelessness affects the basic rights, including the right to nationality, that every citizen enjoys, which includes fundamental rights, civil and political rights, and economic rights.

The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness address various issues related to statelessness in the world. Article 1 of the 1954 Convention defines a ‘stateless person’ as one who is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its law. The 1961 Convention provides that a person may acquire nationality of a contracting state or not be deprived of it if they would otherwise be stateless. Part II of the Indian Constitution stipulates who is a citizen of India, but is silent on stateless persons. It is pertinent to note that India has not ratified either of the two conventions. However as per Article 51 (c) of the Constitution, the Government needs to foster respect for international law which includes treaty obligations that India is party to and customary international law. This includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR), as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and other treaty provisions that safeguard the right against arbitrary deprivation of nationality.

The Citizenship Act of India, 1955 was initially envisaged based on jus soli practice, wherein citizenship was granted by virtue of the person’s birth on state territory. This was followed by the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1986 that introduced restrictions based on jus sanguinis, wherein a person’s citizenship became dependent on citizenship of their parents. Section 3(1)(b) of the Act states that a person born on or after 1 July, 1987 but before the 2003 amendment shall be a citizen if either of their parents were citizens at the time of birth. However, this has the potential of creating a situation of statelessness where both parents are non-citizens or possess no nationality but the child is born in India.

The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 has the serious potential of aggravating the problem of statelessness in India as it excludes ‘illegal migrants’ and their descendents from citizenship. An ‘illegal migrant’ is defined as “a foreigner entering India without valid documents”. Section 3(1)(c) confers citizenship by birth only when at least one parent is an Indian citizen and the other is not an illegal migrant. Further, section 5 and section 6 of the Act explicitly disqualifies illegal migrants and their children from registration and naturalization respectively, and in any case as the registration of minors requires a valid foreign passport, which they do not possess due to statelessness. This poses a threat of statelessness as they are unable to acquire citizenship from any of the provisions of the Citizenship Act, despite residing in India for a long time, having family ties and attachment to India.

The identification of stateless persons within a jurisdiction is an important step in ensuring they are accounted for in legal documents and can benefit from various human rights commitments. In India, the Foreigners Act, 1946, which has been put in place to regulate the entry, presence and departure of foreigners in India, fails to distinguish between the different categories of non-citizens. The Act defines a foreigner as “a person who is not a citizen of India” and bundles both stateless persons and persons with another nationality together without differentiation. Section 8 of the Act on the determination of nationality does not account for the risk of statelessness where, after the completion of the determination procedure, a foreigner appears to have no nationality. There is no mention of ways in which the issue of statelessness can be resolved, or of the fate of such persons on identification.

The Passports Act, 1967 is the only Indian legislation that mentions the category of stateless persons and caters to their need to have a record of their identity. Section 4 of the Act provides for issuance of passport, travel document and certificate of identity. Schedule II part II of the Passport Rules, 1980 states that a Certificate of Identity can be issued for stateless persons residing in India, for foreigners whose country is either not represented in India or whose nationality is in doubt. However, the form for the certificate makes it mandatory to submit a ‘residential permit’ along with information regarding the ‘last permanent address abroad’. This is based on the assumption that the applicant is a migrant from abroad and fails to account for a person who may not have left the country. This was addressed in the case of Sheikh Abdul Aziz v. State NCT of Delhi, where the HC recognised the urgency of determining the legal status of the petitioner as he had been detained for seven years in addition to his sentence under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. The Court directed the Government and the Passport authorities to issue a stateless certificate under Rule 4 and grant him a Long-Term Visa (LTV) after the failure of nationality determination. This enabled his right to a dignified existence upon Indian soil.

More recently, the National Register of Citizens implemented in India has left many on the verge of statelessness. The final NRC list, published on August 31st 2019, excluded about 1.9 million people, leaving them at the risk of statelessness. As per scholars, this coupled with the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 is discriminatory in nature as it only allows non-Muslims, who are religiously persecuted minorities in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, to be granted citizenship. Section 14A added by the 2003 Amendment to the Citizenship Act, 1955 authorized the Government to compulsorily register every Indian citizen in a National Register of Indian Citizens and issue National Identity Cards. The purpose of this is to identify and deport illegal immigrants. The first National Register of Citizen was prepared for Assam, after the 1951 census of India, to identify illegal immigrants, but it was not maintained. This was again taken up following the SC order in 2013 whereby the Government was directed to update the NRC for Assam. As per several high-ranking government ministers, NRC is proposed to be implemented across India. There are concerns that it may result in putting more people across India at the risk of statelessness if they are unable to show documents that prove their ancestors were citizens of India.

Suggested Readings:

  1. “Securing Citizenship India’s legal obligation towards precarious citizens and stateless persons”, Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School, September 2020.
  2. Bikash Singh, ‘Citizenship Amendment Bill: Why Assam is protesting?’ Economic Times (17 December, 2017)
  3. India and the Challenge of statelessness: A review of the legal framework relating to nationality, National Law University, Delhi, 2012.
  4. The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The Worlds Stateless: Deprivation of Nationality, March 2020, Microsoft Word – FINAL PART I.docx (institutesi.org).
  5. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Institutional Discrimination and Statelessness in India, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Mr. Ahmed Shaheed, June 1st 2020, Microsoft Word – Statelessness in India.docx (ohchr.org).

Gauhati High Court on the issue of Res Judicata in Foreigners’ Tribunal Proceedings

parichayteamLeave a comment

This research note is part of Parichay’s ongoing project to study, track, and publish key propositions and latest developments in citizenship law and adjudication in India. This note was prepared by Sitamsini Cherukumalli and edited by Arunima Nair.

I. Background


Res judicata is a principle of law which states that the final decision given by a competent court on a matter between the same parties is binding, and cannot be put to litigation again. It is enshrined in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It was held by Gauhati High Court in Musstt. Amina Khatun vs. Union of India and Ors. [(2018) 4 Gauhati Law Reports 643] that the principle of res judicata, as articulated by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, would not apply in proceedings instituted under the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, since the Foreigners’ Tribunal was not a Court, and the proceedings could not be said to be judicial proceedings.

However, the Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India & Ors [(2019) 6 SCC 604] considered, among other questions, the nature of a Foreigners’ Tribunal proceeding. It held that the opinions given by the Foreigners’ Tribunal were quasi-judicial and not administrative in nature, because such orders by the Foreigners’ Tribunals had civil consequences. It elaborated on the difference at para 23:

The opinion by the Foreigners Tribunal is a quasi-judicial order and not an administrative order. The expression ‘quasi-judicial order’ means a verdict in writing which determines and decides contesting issues and questions by a forum other than a court. The determination has civil consequences. Explaining the meaning of quasi-judicial body in Indian National Congress (I) vs. Institute of Social Welfare & Ors (2002) 5 SCC 685, it was held that when anybody has a legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and a duty to act judicially, such body of persons constitute a quasi-judicial body and decision given by them is a quasi-judicial decision. It would also be a quasi-judicial order if the statute empowers an authority to decide the lis not between the two contesting parties but also when the decision prejudicially affects the subject as against the authority, provided that the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. Further, what differentiates an administrative act from the quasi-judicial act is that a quasi- judicial body is required to make an enquiry before arriving at a conclusion. In addition, an administrative authority is the one which is dictated by policy and expediency whereas a quasi-judicial authority is required to act according to the rules.

II. Gauhati High Court judgments applying Abdul Kuddus in FT cases

Several recent Gauhati High Court orders and judgments have applied Abdul Kuddus to petitions challenging individuals’ second references to FTs after having been declared Indian citizens in a previous FT proceeding. The Jahir Ali v. Union of India and Ors. [WP (C) No. 3402/2020] judgment was given by the Court on 3-3-2021, in response to a writ challenging an order given by the Foreigners’ Tribunal (1st) Mangaldai, Assam in 2018 declaring the petitioner to be a foreigner, despite an earlier order from 2015 by the very same Foreigners’ Tribunal declaring him to be an Indian National. In the 2018 order, the Tribunal held that the principle of res judicata will not apply in a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946, went into the merits of the case again, and found that the Petitioner had not adduced satisfactory evidence.

The Gauhati High Court held in Jahir Ali that as correct as the Tribunal might have been in following the ratio of Amina Khatun (supra) at that time, it was no longer tenable in light of the Abdul Kuddus judgment. They declined to get into the merits of the case or the quality of the evidence adduced, and reiterated that the earlier decision of the Foreigners’ Tribunal declaring the Petitioner to be an Indian would have a binding effect, given that the opinion rendered by a Foreigners’ Tribunal is a quasi-judicial order and not an administrative one. The Court further said that the Foreigners’ Tribunal cannot go into the merits of an earlier order given on the question as they are not exercising an appellate or review jurisdiction.

By applying the principle of res judicata, the Court remanded the matter and directed the concerned Tribunal to only look into the question of whether the present petitioner is the same person in favour of whom the earlier 2015 FT order declaring him to be an Indian national was passed. If found to be the same person, the case is to be dropped and the petitioner is to be “set at liberty without any condition.”

 In Alal Uddin v. Union of India and Ors. [WP (C) 3172/2020], the petitioner had been proceeded  against twice by the same Foreigners’ Tribunal (2nd) in Nagaon, with the Tribunal first declaring the petitioner as an Indian citizen in 2008 and then subsequently declaring him a foreigner in the impugned order from 2019. The petitioner had contested the maintainability of the second reference before the Tribunal by pleading that Abdul Kuddus would bar the second set of proceedings. The Tribunal rejected this contention by proclaiming that Abdul Kuddus was delivered in the context of Abdul Kuddus’ inclusion in the NRC, and is thus inapplicable to the petitioner’s case. The Gauhati High Court in a judgment dated 12-03-2021 disagreed and held that the Tribunal’s interpretation was incorrect. The bench reiterated that Abdul Kuddus explicitly discussed the legal implications of Sarbananda Sonowal Iand II [(2005) 5 SCC 665 and (2007) 1 SCC 174 respectively] and the nature of Foreigners’ Tribunals, especially that they are quasi-judicial authorities whose orders would operate as res judicata. The Court thus set aside the 2019 order by the Nagaon (2nd) Tribunal, and held that the previous Tribunal order from 2008 declaring the petitioner to be an Indian citizen will stand.

Similarly in Bulbuli Bibi v. Union of India [WP (C) 7810/2019], in a judgment rendered on 22-03-2021, the Court reinstated the petitioner’s first FT order from 2013 that held her to be an Indian citizen and set aside the subsequent FT reference from 2017 declaring her to be a foreigner. Although the two reports of the Government Verification Officer in the two references had inconsistencies in the names of the petitioner’s husband and father, the Court opined that these discrepancies are minor and it was clear that it was the same person, i.e. the petitioner, who had been proceeded against twice. By applying Abdul Kuddus,  the Court held that the second 2017 FT order is hit by res judicata and barred.

III. Table of Judgments from Gauhati High Court post-Abdul Kuddus (chronologically descending from latest first)

S.NoName and CitationDate of JudgementJudge(s) NamesRelevant Extracts
1Md. Abdul Syed v. Union of India  

WP(C) 2447/2021		8-4-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra SaikiaLearned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been proceeded twice and, as such, the second proceeding will be hit by the principle of res judicata as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 6 SCC 604.   Registry will call for the records in respect of Case No.BNC/FT/609/2016 from the Foreigners Tribunal, Tezpur 5th, Biswanath Chariali, Biswanath, Assam.   Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has not yet been detained on the strength of the impugned order dated 07.12.2019 passed in Case No.BNC/FT/609/2016 by the Member, Foreigners Tribunal, Tezpur 5th, Biswanath Chariali, Biswanath, Assam.   In that view of the matter, in the meantime, the petitioner, if not already arrested, may not be arrested and deported from India. However, the petitioner shall appear before the Superintendent of Police (Border), Biswanath within 15 (fifteen) days from today, who may obtain necessary information and documentation as required under the rules from the petitioner for securing his presence. On such appearance, the petitioner shall furnish a bail bond of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) with one local surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the said authority in connection with the aforesaid Case No.BNC/FT/609/2016, whereafter, the petitioner shall be allowed to remain on bail. The concerned Superintendent of Police (Border), Biswanath shall also take steps for capturing the fingerprints and biometrics of the iris of the petitioner, if so advised. The petitioner also shall not leave the jurisdiction of Biswanath district without furnishing the details of the place of destination and necessary information including contact number to the Superintendent of Police (Border), Biswanath.
2Ramesha Khatun v. Union of India  

WP(C) 2451/2021		8-4-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra SaikiaLearned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been proceeded twice and, as such, the second proceeding will be hit by the principle of res judicata as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 6 SCC 604.   Registry will call for the records in respect of F.T. Case No.122/F/15 from the Foreigners Tribunal No.2, Dhubri, Assam.   Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has not yet been detained on the strength of the impugned order dated 28.02.2020 passed in F.T. Case No.122/F/15 by the Member, Foreigners Tribunal No.2, Dhubri, Assam.   In that view of the matter, in the meantime, the petitioner, if not already arrested, may not be arrested and deported from India. However, the petitioner shall appear before the Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri within 15(fifteen) days from today, who may obtain necessary information and documentation as required under the rules from the petitioner for securing her presence. On such appearance, the petitioner shall furnish a bail bond of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) with one local surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the said authority in connection with the aforesaid F.T. Case No.122/F/15, whereafter, the petitioner shall be allowed to remain on bail. The concerned Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri shall also take steps for capturing the fingerprints and biometrics of the iris of the petitioner, if so advised. The petitioner also shall not leave the jurisdiction of Dhubri district without furnishing the details of the place of destination and necessary information including contact number to the Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri.
3Must. Afia Khatun v. Union of India  

WP(C) 1297/2020		31-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra Saikia[6] Be that as it may, perhaps the Tribunal could not have proceeded with the matter if it was found that the present petitioner is the same person, who was proceeded earlier in Case No.FT/H/106/2014, in view of the law laid down by Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 6 SCC 304, as the subsequent proceeding will be hit by principle of res- judicata and as such, any subsequent initiation of proceeding against the same person will be impermissible.   [8] Considering the above, we are also of the view that apprehension of the petitioner can be dispelled if the Tribunal examines whether the present petitioner is the same person who was proceeded earlier, for which the petitioner would produce and adduce necessary evidence in that regard before the Tribunal. However, we make it clear that the said examination by the Tribunal would be only for the purpose of finding out as to whether the present petitioner, Musstt.Afia Khatun @ Musstt. Afia Khatoon, W/o Samsul Hoque aged about 42 years is the same person or not, who was proceeded in earlier case i.e. in Case No.FT/H/106/2014 before the Foreigners Tribunal, Hojai, Sankardev Nagar. If the Foreigners Tribunal on hearing of the parties is satisfied that the present petitioner is the same person, who was proceeded in Case No.FT/H/106/2014 before the Foreigners Tribunal, Hojai, Sankardev Nagar, the Tribunal will not proceed further with the present proceeding in F.T.(D) Case Nol.1276/2015 and close the same on the strength of the earlier opinion dated 26.06.2014 by holding the petitioner not to be a foreigner, but an Indian as the second proceeding will be hit by the principle of res- judicata as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus (Supra). However, if it is found that the present petitioner is not same, the Foreigners Tribunal will proceed with the matter in accordance with law.
4Md. Sahar Ali. v. Union of India  

WP(C) 2105/2021		25-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Manish Choudhury[3] It has been submitted that in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Abdul Kuddus vs Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604 , as the principle of res- judicata is applicable in the proceeding before the Foreigners Tribunal, any subsequent initiation of proceeding against the same person will be impermissible. The petitioner submits that accordingly he filed an application before the aforesaid Tribunal on 23.11.2020 praying for not proceeding with the present proceeding initiated against the petitioner by claiming to be the same person in favour of whom the Foreigners Tribunal No.1, Barpeta had earlier on 16.01.2017 given a favourable opinion. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the matter is now pending before the same Tribunal. However, learned counsel for the petitioner apprehends that the matter may be proceeded on merit about his citizenship.   [5] We are of the view that apprehension of the petitioner is not warranted as the Tribunal can examine the petitioner as well as the original documents related to him as to whether the petitioner is the same person who was proceeded earlier. However, we make it clear that the said examination would be only for the purpose of finding out as to whether the present petitioner, Md. Sahar Ali @ Shar Ali S/o Rabi Uddin @ Rab Udin aged about 52 years is the same person or not, who was proceeded in earlier case i.e. in F.T. Case No.226/2016. If the Foreigners Tribunal on hearing of the parties is satisfied that the present petitioner is the same person, who was proceeded in F.T. case no.226/2016, the Tribunal will not proceed further with the present proceeding in F.T. Case No.387/2018 and close the same on the strength of the earlier opinion dated 16.01.2017 by holding the petitioner not to be a foreigner, but an Indian as the second proceeding will be hit by the principle of res-judicata as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus (Supra). However, if it is found that the present petitioner is not same, the Foreigners Tribunal will proceed with the matter in accordance with law.
5Md. Mahar Uddin v. Union of India  

WP(C) 3128/2017		23-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Manish Choudhury[25] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus Vs. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604 has already held that principle of res-judicata is applicable in a proceeding before the Foreigners Tribunal. However, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that, there are instances where proceedings have been reinitiated against the same person, inspite of the person being already declared an Indian. Thus, initiating a subsequent investigation and making another reference and initiating a proceeding again before a Tribunal can be avoided if such data are properly maintained, which will help detect such unnecessary duplication of efforts.   [26] It has been further observed that some of the proceedees though hail originally from one district go to another district for their livelihoods and are proceeded in a different district away from their hometowns. Thus, they face serious disadvantages about gathering evidences and producing witnesses in support of their claim in the remotely located Tribunals. Maintenance of such proper data can help proper investigation, reference and proceeding in the appropriate district to avoid such hardships.   [27] Accordingly, we deemed it appropriate to direct the State Government to examine the feasibility of applying Information and Communication Technology to the proceedings before the Foreigners Tribunals, to maintain and preserve data, to make the functioning of the Foreigners Tribunal more efficient, transparent and systematic. It has been stated at the Bar that a large number of cases of more than 1.4 lakhs of suspected illegal immigrants are pending before the Foreigners Tribunals and many more persons are being investigated for reference. Thus, use of Information and Communication Technology will certainly enhance efficacy, help proper management of the huge number of cases and avoid duplicating and conflicting opinions.
6Bulbuli Bibi v. Union of India  

WP (C) 7810/2019		22-03-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ.  Soumitra Singh[7] Thus it appears that the only difference or inconsistency is about the difference is the name of the husband, viz. Nazim and Najimuddin. We feel that this difference is minor and not substantial and hence can be ignored. Similarly, the name of the father of the proceedee has been recorded as late Giapuddin Fakir in the first proceeding and in the second proceeding, it has been recorded as Giyas Fakir. We are also of the opinion that these are minor variations, and as such the same can be ignored.   [8] From the above, it appears that it was the same person who was sought to be proceeded against. However the finding given in the first proceeding under Case no. K/FT/D/771/11(B/KJR/D, voter/2010/164) vide opinion dated 30.09.2013 that the proceedee is not a foreigner of 1966-1971 stream and her name should not have been recorded in the ‘D’ voters list. The said finding given in earlier opinion dated on 30.09.2013 has not been interfered with and has attained finality. Accordingly, we are of the view that the subsequent finding opinion given by the Foreigners’ Tribunal in K/FT/D/714/10, (No. B/KJR/D.voter/2010/108, dated 23.12.2010) rendered 18.08.2017 is barred by principle of res-judicata, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment reported in Abdul Kuddus vs Union of India, (2019) Vol. 6 SCC 604, that in the proceedings before the Foreigners’ Tribunal, the principle of res-judicata is applicable.
7Sabiran Khatun v. Union of India  

WP(C)/8372/2019		16-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra SaikiaLearned counsel for the petitioner submits that the subsequent proceeding initiated by Foreigners Tribunal No.2, Kamrup (M), Guwahati in FT (D.V.) Case No.457/2018 is hit by principles of res judicata in view of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604 . Accordingly, since the petitioner was earlier opined to be an Indian Citizen by the Foreigners’ Tribunal No.1, Dhubri, in F.T. Case No.1076/D/11, the present proceeding cannot lie being barred by the principles of res judicata. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No.2, Kamrup(M) is not maintainable. We are also, prima facie, satisfied that in Abdul Kuddus (Supra) case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the Foreigners’ Tribunal is a quasi judicial body and the principles of res judicata will apply.   In view of above, we are prima facie satisfied that the order passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No.2, Kamrup(M) in FT (D.V.) Case No.457/2018 on 14.10.2019 needs to be stayed for further consideration and accordingly, the proceedings in FT (D.V.) Case No.457/2018 shall remain stayed until further orders.
8Alal Uddin v. Union of India and Ors.  

WP (C) 3172/2020		12-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra Saikia[4] We are, however, unable to agree with the said opinion of the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No.II, Nagaon passed on 30.09.2019. Though, in Abdul Kuddus (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the matter relating to inclusion of the name in the NRC, yet at the same time the Hon’ble Supreme Court had also considered the provisions of Foreigners’ (Tribunals) Order, 1964 and had discussed about the various legal implications arising out of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 as well as Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 174 and elaborately discussed about the procedure for disposal of such matter by the learned Tribunal under the Foreigners’ (Tribunals) Order, 1964 and in that context it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Tribunal functions as a quasi-judicial authority and it would be incorrect to hold that the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal and/or the consequential order passed by the Registering Authority would not operate as res judicata.   [6] Accordingly, the present petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 30.09.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal (2nd) Nagaon in F.T. Case no.1082/2011. As a result, the order passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal (2nd), Nagaon on 19.08.2008 shall stand revived and the petitioner’s status as an Indian citizen in terms of the earlier opinion passed by the learned Foreigner’s Tribunal (2nd), Nagaon, on19.08.2008 will stand.
9Jahir Ali vs. Union of India  

WP (C) No. 3402/2020		3-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra Saikia[15] Be that as it may, since we have already held that the principle of res judicata will apply in view of the decision in Abdul Kuddus (supra), the Foreigners’ Tribunal in the present instant proceeding cannot re-examine the legality or otherwise of the opinion rendered earlier by the Foreigners’ Tribunal, except to ascertain as to whether the petitioner was the same person against whom the Foreigners’ Tribunal in F.T. Case No.771/2012 had given its opinion. If it is found on consideration of the materials on record and after hearing the parties that the present petitioner was indeed the same person against whom the Foreigners’ Tribunal had given its opinion in the earlier proceeding in F.T.Case No.771/2012, the present proceeding will be barred by application of principle of res judicata.   [16] Accordingly, for the reasons recorded above, we allow this petition by remanding the matter to the concerned learned Tribunal to consider the case of the petitioner afresh by giving him an opportunity to prove that the present petitioner, namely, Jahir Ali, aged about 52 years, S/O Nesar Ali @ Mesar Ali,R/O Ward No.6, PO & PS-Mangaldai, District-Darrang, Assam, is one and the same person in whose favour an opinion was earlier given by the same Tribunal on 15.07.2015 in F.T. Case.
10Musst. Fulbanu Nessa v. Union of India  

WP(C) 725/2021		15-2-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra SaikiaAccordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the subsequent review and the opinion rendered by the Foreigners’ Tribunal, Diphu, on 16.03.2020 is ex facie illegal apart from the fact that in the present case the principle of res judicata applies as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2019) 6 SCC 604.   It has been submitted that the petitioner is in custody since 17.03.2020 on the strength of the aforesaid order dated 16.03.2020 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal, Diphu.  On perusal of the materials available on records, we are prima facie satisfied that the petitioner has made out a case for her release on bail and suspension of the order dated 16.03.2020 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal, Diphu.  
11Sabita Das vs The Union Of India  

WP(C) 182/2020  		12-2-2021HMJ. Michael ZothankhumaThe plea was specifically taken before the Foreigners Tribunal-II, Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur that the petitioner has been already declared as not a foreigner. Ext.-9, which, however was not accepted by the Tribunal. It has been submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus Vs. Union of India, reported in 2019 (6) SCC 604 has held that the principle of res judicata will also apply in the proceedings before the Foreigners Tribunal. The matter needs examination. We are prima facie satisfied that the impugned order needs to be stayed.  
12Rejia Khatun v. Union of India  

WP(C) 2811/2020		31-8-2020HMJ. Manojit Bhuyan, HMJ. Hitesh Kumar SarmaPetitioner has put to challenge the proceedings in FT Case No.2854/2012, pending before the Foreigners’ Tribunal Tezpur (1 st), Assam, primarily on the ground that in an earlier proceeding i.e. in FT Case No.14/2016, she was declared as not a foreigner. Reliance is placed on the principle of res- judicata by making reference to the case in Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India and Others (Civil Appeal No.5012/2019), reported in (2019) 6 SCC 604.   Issue Notice.   No fresh steps are required to be taken as all respondents are represented. Heard on the interim prayer.   Pending disposal of the writ petition, the proceeding in FT Case No.2854/2012 pending before the Foreigners’ Tribunal Tezpur (1st), Assam shall remain stayed.
13Basanti Sarkar v. Union of India and Ors.  

WP(C) 6768/2019		18-12-2019HMJ. Suman Shyam, HMJ. Parthivjyothi SaikiaThis writ petition is directed against the final order and opinion dated 31/07/2019 passed by the Foreigner’s Tribunal(2), Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur, in connection with FT Case No. 262/2007.   Mr.Bhowmik submits that besides being perverse, the impugned order is also barred under the principles of res judicata since the petitioner has already been declared as an Indian citizen by the Foreigner’s Tribunal by order dated 21/04/2010.   From the perusal of the materials on record, we find that by order dated 21/04/2010 passed in connection with LFT-II(D) case No. 274/2008, the learned Tribunal had declared that the petitioner is not a foreigner. The said order was passed after taking note of the documents including voters’ list of 1966 produced by the petitioner, which contains the names of the father and mother of the petitioner.   Under the circumstances, we are of the prima facie view that the subsequent opinion of the learned Foreigner’s Tribunal is untenable in the eye of law.
14Sribas Biswas v. Union of India  

WP(C) 495/2019		1-2-2019HMJ. Achintya Malla Bujor Barua, HMJ. Ajit BorthakurThe petitioner raises an issue that two parallel reference proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, where one of them resulted in judgment and order dated 30.05.2014 in FT.K.D.V Case No.8716/2011, wherein he had been declared to be a citizen of India. Upon the said fact being brought to the notice of the Tribunal in the other proceeding being FT.K.1746/2017, the Tribunal by the order dated 11.10.2018 by relying on the pronouncement of this Court in Amina Khatun –vs Union of India and others, reported in 2018 (3) GLT 1took the view that as the principle of res-judicata is not applicable, therefore, the other proceeding is maintainable.   An issue for consideration would arise as to whether a parallel proceeding in contradistinction with that of a subsequent proceeding would be maintainable merely by following the principle laid down in Amina Khatun (supra) that the principle of res-judicata is not applicable in respect of a reference under the Foreigners Tribunal Order, 1964.   In view of the above, in the interim, it is provided that further proceeding in the FTK No.1746/2017 before the Foreigners Tribunal No.4, Kamrup (M) be stayed.
15Maran Das v. Union of India

WP(C) 477/2019		1-2-2019HMJ. Achintya Malla Bujor Barua, HMJ. Ajit BorthakurThe petitioner raises an issue that two parallel reference proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, where one of them resulted in judgment and order dated 25.01.2017 in FT.K.D.V Case No.279/2016, wherein he had been declared to be a citizen of India. Upon the said fact being brought to the notice of the Tribunal in the other proceeding being FT.K.84/2018, the Tribunal by the order dated 11.10.2018 by relying on the pronouncement of this Court in Amina Khatun –vs Union of India and others, reported in 2018 (3) GLT 1 took the view that as the principle of res-judicata is not applicable, therefore, the other proceeding is maintainable.   An issue for consideration would arise as to whether a parallel proceeding in contradistinction with that of a subsequent proceeding would be maintainable merely by following the principle laid down in Amina Khatun (supra) that the principle of res-judicata is not applicable in respect of a reference under the Foreigners Tribunal Order, 1964.   In view of the above, in the interim, it is provided that further proceeding in the FTK No.84/2018 before the Foreigners Tribunal No.4, Kamrup (M) be stayed.

This note was last updated on 11 May 2021.

Absence of Jurisdictional Fact of Application of Mind in the Reference

parichayteamLeave a comment

This research note is part of Parichay’s ongoing project to study, track, and publish key propositions and latest developments in citizenship law and adjudication in India.

  1. The Referring Authority is required to show the application of mind to the facts and law before him, and then record his satisfaction based on the materials collected by the Investigating Officer before forwarding a reference to the Tribunal.
  • State of Assam v. Moslem Mandal reported in (2013) 3 GLR 402 at para 98 [Full Bench]

“[97] The reference by the referral authority also cannot be mechanical. The referral authority has to apply his mind on the materials collected by the investigating officer during investigation and make the reference on being satisfied that there are grounds for making such reference. The referral authority, however, need not pass a detailed order recording his satisfaction. An order agreeing with the investigation would suffice. The referral authority also, while making the reference, shall produce all the materials collected during investigation before the Tribunal, as the Tribunal is required prima facie to satisfy itself about the existence of the main grounds before issuing the notice to the proceedee.”.

  1. Meaning of Application of Mind:
  • Application of mind is not defined in any case but has been applied in various contexts where an authority is given discretionary powers and it has been held that the power is to be exercised by application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand.
  • When discretion is conferred on an authority, it must personally exercise the same; it must apply its own mind to the facts and circumstances of each case and come to its own decision. If the authority acts without applying its mind to the case before it, then the action or decision taken by it will be without jurisdiction because it has not exercised its discretion in accordance with the law.
  • In accordance with State of Assam v. Moslem Mandal reported in (2013) 3 GLR 402 at para 98, along with the case file, the referring authority must forward their observations recording their satisfaction in such manner that demonstrates their application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of such reasons must be held to vitiate the entire proceeding before the Foreigners’ Tribunal.
  • The non-application of mind is even more relevant in ex parte cases where the opinion of the Foreigners’ Tribunal is based entirely on the main grounds along with the supporting materials forwarded with the reference.
  1. Facets to demonstrate the application of mind:
  • Material facts of the case should be taken into consideration:

In the case of Satpal v. State of Haryana (AIR 2000 SC 1702), in the context of the pardoning powers of the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that the decision-making authority must be apprised of the materials facts in the case to demonstrate proper application of mind.

  • The authority should be personally satisfied:

The appropriate authority must be personally satisfied as to the grounds on the basis of which the decision is taken. For example, in the case of Jaganath v. State of Orissa (AIR 1966 SC 1140), an order of detention under rule 30(1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules was challenged on the ground that it was as not based upon the satisfaction of the Government. The Supreme Court observed that in the order of detention, six grounds were verbatim reproduced from the relevant empowering section, whereas the affidavit of the Minister who issued the order indicated that he was “personally satisfied” of only two out of the six grounds mentioned in the order. The Supreme Court ruled that the Minister had acted mechanically in passing the order and quashed the order of detention.

  • Application of mind must be apparent from the order itself:

In the context of the issuance of summons on a private criminal complaint, the Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), has held that application of mind has to be indicated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. The Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of the complaint. There must be sufficient indication in the order as to the application of mind. Similarly, in Birla Corporation Limited v. Adventz Investments and Holdings Ltd. & Another (AIR 2019 SC 2390), the Supreme Court has held that application of mind has to be indicated by disclosure of mind on satisfaction, through a reasoned order (though not elaborately reasoned). To give reasoned decisions is a requirement of natural justice and the order must show which particular circumstance received due consideration while arriving at the decision [State (Delhi Administration) vs Anil Puri And Ors. 28 (1985) DLT 474, para 10]

  • Application of mind must be prima facie through the reasons recorded:

As per Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the Income Tax Department has the power to reassess an individual’s previously filed income tax returns by sending a notice under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 along with recording one’s satisfaction that the income has escaped assessment. In Joint Commissioner of Income-Tax v. George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. (2002 SCC OnLine Gau 351; (2002) 258 ITR 126; (2003) 181 CTR 69), a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court held that in the absence of specific material before the assessing authority and any independent enquiry, there did not appear to be a link between the facts found and the satisfaction arrived at by the assessing authority. It was accordingly held that there was no application of mind to the facts alleged to have been found, and the action taken was quashed as being not maintainable in law. Similarly, in the case of Pr. CIT vs. G & G Pharma India Ltd. ((2016) 384 ITR 147 (Del.)), the Delhi High Court held that application of mind by the Assessing Officer to the material produced before issuing the notice for reassessment was a basic jurisdictional requirement for reassessment. Without analysing and forming a prima facie opinion on the basis of the material produced, it was not possible for the Assessing Officer to conclude that he had reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. For other High Courts, see Yuvraj v. Union of India ((2009) 315 ITR 84) [Bombay High Court Division Bench]; Kamala Properties v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Special Range-IV Calcutta (1992 SCC OnLine Cal 124; (1992) 2 CHN 295) [Calcutta High Court Single Judge].

  • Non-application of mind is a jurisdictional error and would result in vitiation of the proceedings:

In Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat ((1995) 5 SCC 302), a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court quashed proceedings initiated under the TADA for the reason that the sanction granted by the State Government for the prosecution was without the proper application of mind. It observed that the State Government merely followed the advice of the Deputy Superintendent of Police without any independent application of mind to the facts and held as follows:

“[14] The present was thus a clear case of exercise of power on the basis of external dictation. That the dictation came on the prayer of the DSP will not make any difference to the principle. The DSP did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by the statute and did not grant approval to the recording of the information under TADA in the exercise of his discretion.

[15] The aforesaid is however not all. Even if it be accepted that as an additional safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of the drastic provisions, the State Government had provided by administrative instructions an additional safeguard whereunder the DSP was required to obtain the sanction/consent of the State Government, we are of the view that in the present case the same was given by the State Government without proper application of mind. We have taken this view because the sanction/consent was given by the Government merely on the basis of the fax message dated 17-3-1995 of the DSP. The reason for our saying so is that though there is no record a fax message of Deputy Director General of Police also, which is dated 18-3-1995, the sanction/consent order has mentioned above the fax message of the DSP only. Now, no doubt the message of the DSP is quite exhaustive, as would appear from that message which has been quoted above in full, we are inclined to think that before agreeing to the use of harsh provisions of TADA against the appellants, the Government ought to have taken some steps to satisfy itself whether what had been stated by the DSP was borne out by the records, which apparently had not been called for in the present case, as the sanction/consent was given post-haste on 18-3-1995, i.e., the very next day of the message of the DSP… The State Government gave the sanction without even discussing the matter with the investigating officer and without assessing the situation independently. All these show lack of proper and due application of mind by the State Government while giving sanction/consent.

[16] For the aforesaid twin reasons, we state that the entire proceeding against the appellants under TADA is vitiated and the same is, therefore, quashed.”