Section 6A and Assam

In the year 1950, the Immigrant (Expulsion from Assam) Act was passed by the Parliament. The objects and purpose of the Act read: “During the last few months a serious situation had arisen from the immigration of a very large number of East Bengal residents into Assam. Such large migration is disturbing the economy of the province besides giving rise to a serious law and order problem” (see here). While the Act allowed the Central Government to give “directions in regard to” the removal of individuals from Assam, the application of the Act was barred against individuals who “on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances in any area” of Pakistan had been “displaced” or left their residence. While this Act marked the beginning of issues concerning migration, these issues came into the limelight with the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, which led to a widespread migration from Bangladesh to Assam. 

The subsequent enfranchisement of refugees/migrants prompted the All Assam Students Union (AASU) to spearhead an “anti-foreigner” agitation in 1979, demanding “detection, disenfranchisement and deportation” of foreigners. Despite this agitation and resistance, Indira Gandhi’s government called for assembly elections in Assam in February 1983. While the AASU demanded for a boycott of elections, sections of Bengali Muslims decided to vote nonetheless in order to “effectively prove their claim to Indian citizenship”. These tensions culminated in the Nellie massacre which claimed around 1800 people according to official records, most of whom were Bengali Muslims. In the aftermath of Nellie, two legal developments followed. First, in 1985, a political settlement was reached between the agitators and the Central and State Governments, named the Assam Accord. Introduced through an amendment, Section 6A of the Citizenship Act was a legislative enactment for furthering the terms of this accord. Under Section 6A, any person who entered Assam from Bangladesh before the 1st of January, 1966 will be deemed a citizen of India. Persons who settled in the state between January 2, 1966 and March 24, 1971 would have to register themselves according to the rules laid down by the Central Government and would enjoy all other rights except the right to vote for a ten-year period. (see here) At the lapse of the ten-year period, they would become eligible to be enrolled in the electoral rolls. Finally, all those who migrated after the aforementioned date were to be expelled. 

The second important development happened two years before the Assam Accord, wherein Parliament passed the  Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals Act) of 1983. Read with Illegal Migrant Rules of 1984, these two would act in conjunction to “detect and deport” foreigners by Tribunals established under this Act. The IMDT Act allowed for complaints to be brought to the police by a person living within a 3 kilometer radius of the foreigner suspected to have entered India without the necessary travel documents. It also placed the burden of proof on the State and the complainant, to establish the person’s status as “illegal migrant”. However, the Act was challenged by Sarbananda Sonowal before the Supreme Court. 

In pronouncing the judgement, the Court relied upon a report by the Governor of Assam, S.K. Sinha which claimed that, “Muslim militant organisations [had] mushroomed in Assam” as a result of illegal migration from Bangladesh. While Governor Sinha’s report was not backed by any data or surveys, the Court nonetheless held that there was an “external aggression” against the State of Assam. Subsequently, invoking Article 355 of the Constitution, the Court held that IMDT’s placement of burdens was insufficient to check the issues laid down in Sinha’s report, and hence went on to hold the Act and the Rules unconstitutional. After Sarbananda Sonowal, the regime, rather than being governed by IMDT, returned to Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, the Foreigners Act, and the Foreigners Tribunal Order.

Section 6A and the Assam Accord are often seen as the “genesis of the updated NRC in Assam”. Section 6A is instrumental in the creation of the National Register of Citizens (‘NRC’) in Assam, which is currently being updated under the supervision of the Supreme Court. The process requires a person to prove their Indian citizenship by providing government documents that establish their family legacy and their right to reside in India. This tedious process is often impossible for persons with limited resources, resulting in them being left off the NRC and stripped of the protection offered by citizenship.

It is in this context that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act was challenged before the Supreme Court in a petition by a Guwahati-based civil society organisation, Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha (ASM) in 2012. While referring the case to a bigger bench, Justice Nariman framed thirteen questions of law. 

While a five-judge constitution bench was instituted by Chief Justice J.S. Khehar in 2017 which conducted two hearings, it was decided to reconstitute a fresh bench later. Subsequently, as the question still remains unanswered, it is evident that the lack of clarity has resulted in a lack of clarity about applicable legal standards for citizenship determination in Assam. There is an imminent need for the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of the Section. Delaying the ruling will only be harmful to the lives of thousands whose citizenship hangs in the balance.

Suggested Reading Material :-

  1. Anupama Roy, Mapping Citizenship in India (Oxford University Press 2010) ch 2.
  2. Abdul Kalam Azad, M. Mohsin Alam Bhat and Harsh Mander, ‘Citizenship and the Mass Production of Statelessness in Assam’, India Exclusion Report 2019-2020 http://centreforequitystudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/India-Exclusion-Report-2019-20-e-copy.pdf accessed 16 June 2021.
  3. Ashna Ashesh and Arun Thiruvengadam, ‘Report on Citizenship Law: India’, GlobalCit Country Report July 2017 https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/47124/GLOBALCIT_CR_2017_12.pdf?sequence=1 accessed 16 June 2021.
  4. Niraja Gopala Jayal, ‘Citizenship’ in Sujit Choudhary, Madhav Khosla, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press 2016).

DEPORTATION AND DETENTION

[The Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School is currently offering the year-long Clinic on Citizenship and Statelessness, where students are developing research outputs on citizenship issues in India and assessing the citizenship determination framework under international law. This research note, prepared by Andolan Sarkar, is part of the clinic’s outcomes.]

A foreigner as defined in Section 2(a) of the Foreigners Act of 1946 (‘the Act’) means a person who is not a citizen of India.[1] The ambit of this act extends to stipulating the deportation or detention of such foreigners. The definition of a foreigner within the Act, however, is vague since it negates the distinction between refugees, illegal migrants, and asylum seekers.

Deportation entails the expulsion of a foreigner from their current resident country to their country of origin or any other third country by any lawful authority on grounds authorised by law. While detention entails the lawful confinement of any individual, such confinement must be prescribed by any statute and sanctioned by the Court. The relevance of this discussion hinges on the several petitions challenging deportation orders and  thousands of individuals being detained in detention centres in dingy conditions for prolonged periods without a fair trial.

The authority of the Indian State to deport arises from Section 3 of the Act which allows the State to make orders restricting the stay of “foreigners” within Indian territory. Threat to national security, illegal entry into the country, commission of crimes by foreigners, residence within the country after the expiration of visa, violation of visa conditions, and nationality under question are some of the grounds on which the State has previously administered deportation orders.

In Assam, in particular, vide Notification No. 1/7/61–F.III dated the 22nd March 1961, the authority of the state to adjudge individuals as foreigners under clauses (c) and (cc) of Sub–section (2) of Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, was extended to the Superintendent of Police and Deputy Commissioners under the Govt. of Assam. This was followed by the entrustment of such a power by the President vide Notification No. 14011/13/75-F.III dated 17.02.1976 by virtue of under clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution. This was however, subject to the various conditions.[2] The power of issuing orders for detention, however, was not entrusted and yet has been exercised wherein movement of foreigners is being curtailed and they are being placed in foreigner wards in jails or detention centres. This is in conformity with the Madras High Court judgement dated 21.09.2007 in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1138 of 2006 titled Latha v. Public Department and Innocent v. State of Goa(which later reaffirmed this judgement)wherein it was deemed permissible for the state government to act under delegated powers under Section 3(2)(e) in keeping a foreigner in a detention camp.

Since there is immense administrative control without any definitive statutory grounds based on which deportation can take place, the State has often tried to pass arbitrary orders. For instance, in Kamil Siedczynski,[3] the State issued a Leave India Notice to a Polish student studying in West Bengal for participating in a protest against a new Indian legislation. The Court held such an order to be null and void, since it was arbitrary and without any reason. The Court held that the student was on a valid visa, and merely protesting against the State does not warrant a deportation.

Additionally, The State does not enjoy unfettered discretion to expel any foreigner. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution allows for the deprivation of life and liberty only on the basis of procedure established by law. The deportation of any foreigner must be in compliance with Article 21 and other international principles. A deportation order must be assessed by the courts to be just, fair, and reasonable as interpreted by Article 21.[4] A deportation order restricting the stay of a foreigner must also be proportionate to the end goal that it seeks to achieve.

Few principles in domestic and international law act as safeguards against the deportation of foreigners. For instance, Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention talks about non-refoulement, which means that no State can send foreigners back to the place where they may face the risk of persecution. India has often argued that it has no obligation to comply with the non-refoulement principle since it is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, India must abide by the non-refoulement principle while deporting foreigners as the principle has evolved to be a part of the customary international law and is embedded in several other international instruments to which India is a signatory.

Deportation and detention run hand in hand. Section 3(2)(g) of the Act empowers the State to make orders in relation to the arrest and detention of foreigners. Foreigners awaiting deportation, individuals who do not possess documents, or foreigners whose nationality cannot be determined are kept under detention. Detention is justified by the State on grounds that Article 19 is not applicable to foreigners.[5]

Furthermore, the actions of the government actors flout procedure when detaining individuals under the pretence of them being foreigners. As per Section 4(2) of the Act, every officer making an arrest under Section 4 shall, without unnecessary delay, take or send the person arrested before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or to the officer in charge of the nearest police-station and the provisions of Section 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (5 of 1898) shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of any such arrest. The same is not undertaken in the initiation of proceedings or competition of proceedings before the FTs.

Foreigners are detained for prolonged time periods due to lack of proper deportation procedures. Deportation can only take place when the receiving country is willing to accept the alleged foreigner. In several cases, foreigners are detained indefinitely as no other countries are willing to accept them. Many alleged foreigners claim to be Indian citizens, but are not able to challenge the decision of Foreigners’ Tribunals. This implies that several Indian citizens may have been wrongfully termed as foreigners and in the absence of any challenges, they still remain under wrongful detention. This runs contrary to the principles enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR by virtue of which every individual, irrespective of their nationality, deserves a fair trial and has a right to approach the courts.[6]

It is to be noted that the power of detention enshrined in Section 3(2)(g) and Section 4 were deleted from the Foreigners Act vide the Foreigners Amendment Act, 1957 after the then Attorney General of India, Mr. MC Setalvad, conceded to its lack of compliance with Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution in the case of Hans Muller of Nuremberg v. Supdt. Presidency Jail, Calcutta, (1955) 1 SCR 1284. Such power was reintroduced by virtue of an amendment in 1962 in light of the war with China. It was via an amendment in 2013, that this power was addressed in Paragraph 3 of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964.

Additionally, courts have looked down upon indefinite detention, since it runs contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.[7] In Hussainara Khatoon,[8] the Court spoke about pre-trial detention and stated that “a procedure which keeps such large numbers of people behind bars without trial for so long cannot possibly be regarded as ‘reasonable, just or fair’”. Additionally, the courts, in the case of State of Assam v. Moslem Mandal, (2013) 3 GLR 402stated that there is a limitation of 2 months for the duration of how long a foreigner may be detained.

The detention of foreigners is administrative in nature. These foreigners have not committed any penal offence; therefore, they are placed in detention centres awaiting deportation. Even if convicted of a penal offence, they are placed there after completing their sentence. Foreigners in detention centres must be treated with dignity. Unfortunately, the condition of these detention-centres is highly appalling as they fail to provide the detainees with proper food, water, hygiene, healthcare and other basic facilities.[9] This runs contrary to the hearing in Santanu Borthakur v. Union of India, tagged with W.P. (Crl) 7/2020 titled Abantee Dutta v. Union of India.The courts, vide Order 07.10.2020, observed that foreigners could not be held in jails and that the detention centres created by state government is in compliance with the standards stipulated by the central government.

The Act, first, ought to make a clear distinction between all categories of non-citizens. Further,  it needs to mention definitive grounds based on which deportation can take place. In the absence of such grounds, the administration enjoys too much leeway in administering deportation orders. Most importantly, alleged foreigners cannot be made to live in inhuman conditions within these detention-centres for an indefinite time period. Foreigners ought to be governed by a regime of rights, where they are granted all the necessary facilities within the detention-centres. A foreigner enjoys all rights as mentioned under Article 21. The government and the local-administration should be the first points to ensure the well-being of all foreigners.    

SUGGESTED READINGS:


The Search for Foreigners in Assam – An Analysis of Cases Before a Foreigners’ Tribunal and the High Court

Leah Verghese and Shruthi Naik are executive team members at DAKSH India.

The Gauhati High Court recently set aside an order by a Foreigners’ Tribunal in Assam that declared Haidar Ali a foreigner for failing to establish linkage with seven people whose names appear along with his grandparents’ names in the 1970 voter list. This order has once again brought to the spotlight the flawed citizenship adjudicatory process in Assam. To understand these processes better, the authors have analysed 818 orders passed by Foreigners Tribunal No. 4 in Hajo between 16 June 2017 and 30 December 2019 (obtained through RTI) and 787 orders and judgments of the Gauhati High Court delivered between 2010 and 2019, resulting from writ petitions filed against orders of the Foreigners Tribunals. In this article, the authors explore the process of adjudication of citizenship in Assam, in terms of fairness, procedural aspects, and time taken through an analysis of these orders.

Analysis of Foreigners Tribunal orders

98 per cent of the suspected foreigners brought before Hajo Foreigners Tribunal No. 4 during this period were Muslim. This is not reflective of the population of Hajo, which has a 44 per cent Muslim population, and neither are these numbers explained by the demographic composition of Bangladesh. The 1951 census showed that in East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh), non-Muslims comprised 23.20 per cent of the population. This proportion became 19.57 per cent in 1961, 14.60 per cent in 1974, 13.40 per cent in 1981, 11.70 per cent in 1991 and 10.40 per cent in 2001. The abnormally high proportion of Muslims (as compared to their population in Hajo or even Bangladesh) brought before the tribunal during this period indicates that they are being targeted.

The orders also reflect a serious non-application of the judicial mind. A majority of orders followed a set of templates with only the names of persons, the police station involved, and the dates relating to the case being changed. The descriptions of investigations by the police are like movie scripts riddled with obvious plot holes. In 733 cases, the police claim to have met the suspected foreigners. During these alleged visits, the police asked these suspected foreigners to produce documentary proof of their citizenship, and 570 of them allegedly told the police that they had no documents to prove that they are Indian citizens. The orders do not mention what kind of documentary proof the police asked for.  It is a little difficult to believe that when it comes to a matter as serious as citizenship, 570 people could not produce even a scrap of paper furthering their claim. This leads us to wonder whether the police’s accounts of these visits is credible. In 218 of these cases, the police also concluded which district in Bangladesh (mostly from Maimansingh) the suspected foreigners were from, despite the complete absence of any documentary proof of citizenship. Apart from these alleged meetings with the suspected foreigners, the orders do not describe any police investigation.

Although the police claimed they were able to meet suspected foreigners before submitting their enquiry report, in at least 98 per cent of such cases, they were unable to locate them subsequently to serve a notice to appear before the Foreigners Tribunal. The reason often cited in the orders is that the police could not find the person at their place of residence and local residents and the gaon burahs did not know of their whereabouts when the police enquired with them. We spoke to an advocate practicing at the Gauhati High Court (who has also appeared before the Foreigner Tribunals) who revealed that in some cases, the gaon burahs have also appeared as witnesses for the suspected foreigners and confirmed that the police did not question them and that the person does live in their village. The process adopted by Foreigners Tribunals does not allow the police to be cross-examined by suspected foreigners’ advocates. The lack of a procedure to cross-examine the police leaves no scope to challenge the police’s submissions regarding their alleged meetings with the suspected foreigners and their subsequent inability to find the same people.

The inability to find these suspected foreigners to serve the Foreigners Tribunal’s notice on them works out conveniently for the police and the tribunal. Unlike regular criminal trials where an accused is presumed not guilty and the state has to prove that they committed a crime, the burden of proof as per Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 is on the person accused of being a foreigner. This reversed burden means that if a person fails to appear before the Foreigners Tribunal, the Tribunal can pass an order declaring them foreigners without hearing the suspected foreigner. We found that 96 per cent of the orders we analysed were given ex-parte. In all these orders, the police produced no evidence to indicate that the suspected foreigners were not Indian. Yet, they were declared Bangladeshi because of the reversal of the burden of proof.

Only in 31 cases were the suspected foreigners allowed to refute the allegations made against them. All these 31 orders were passed by the tribunal member Giti Kakati Das. The progression of her career as a member of the Foreigners Tribunal gives an idea of the effect of declaring a low number of individuals to be foreigners. She was appointed as a member of this Foreigners Tribunal by an order of the Commissioner and Secretary, Home and Political Department dated 29 July 2015 on a contractual basis for one year. After one year, her services were extended for another year, till July 2017. Through a notification dated 20 June 2017, she was denied an extension along with several other members because she had not declared enough people as foreigners. She was reinstated only after she and the others challenged the termination of their services before the Gauhati High Court.

In addition to concerns of fairness, the suspected foreigners also had to go through long drawn proceedings. Given that most of the cases we analysed were decided ex-parte, we expected that these proceedings would have at least progressed swiftly. With a lack of information on the exact filing date of cases before the Foreigners Tribunals, we attempted to understand how long cases took to be disposed of by approximating the filing date as the median date of the year in which the police were asked to investigate the suspected foreigner. This Foreigners Tribunal took on average an astounding 3,637 days, i.e., nearly ten years, to dispose of a case. Of course, with the focus on Foreigners Tribunals in recent years, it is interesting to note that 92 per cent of the cases analysed were disposed of in the years 2018 and 2019 alone. It is also interesting to note that in 82 per cent of the cases, the report of service of notice being forwarded or notice being served in a substituted manner was done in the years 2018 and 2019, although the cases dated as far back as 1999. The cases seem to have been kept in cold storage for several years, then taken out, dusted, and disposed of with undue haste in 2018 and 2019. Further, even though cases were pending for such a long time, the Foreigners Tribunals decided these cases post-haste once the police reported that they could not find the suspected foreigner to serve the tribunal’s notice. In such circumstances (where the individual could not be found) the matter could be decided ex-parte. On average, the tribunal took 39 days from the date of receipt of this report to give ex-parte orders.   

97% of these orders direct that the proceedees be deported. Very few of these, if any, will be actually deported since deportation requires Bangladesh’s consent. According to data placed before the Lok Sabha as of 10 December 2019, only four Bangladeshis have been deported pursuant to their declaration as ‘foreigner’ by Foreigners Tribunals in Assam. If deportation is not possible, persons declared to be foreigners are supposed to be sent to detention centers within prisons in Assam, pending deportation.

Analysis of High Court judgments

41% of cases in the High Court judgments and orders pertained to orders passed by Foreigners Tribunals in the districts of Morigaon, Barpeta, and Goalpara. Although none of these districts share a border with Bangladesh, Barpeta has the largest number of Foreigners Tribunals. 35% of the High Court decisions we analysed involved ex-parte orders passed by Foreigners Tribunals.

All the persons whose cases reached the High Court in the set we analysed, had some form of documentation, ranging from electoral rolls, land records, and panchayat certificates. 61% of them had electoral rolls and 39% had permanent residential certificates/ certificates from the panchayat. In 66% of these cases, the Foreigners Tribunals found the documentation unsatisfactory, and in 38% of them, documentation was rejected because spellings did not match. In 71% of the cases, the secondary evidence was deemed not to be admissible. Secondary evidence is usually a copy of the document and not the original. Such evidence gets rejected because either these were not certified copies or the person who created the document (e.g., panchayat member, school principal, etc.) could not certify its contents.  One in two people were declared foreigners because the authorities that issued the documents produced before the tribunals failed to appear before the Foreigners Tribunals to testify that the documents produced are genuine and authentic to their knowledge.

Along with issues of procedural fairness, the issue of judicial delay was apparent in this round of analysis as well. The High Court took 477 days (1.3 years) on average to decide these cases and the average number of days between hearings was 116 days.. For these numbers to be put in context, they were compared with similar figures for other cases before the Gauhati High Court. As per data available in the DAKSH database for other cases, the average number of days between hearings was 31 days, and the overall time taken to dispose cases was 277 days (0.7 years). The cases filed against the orders of Foreigners Tribunals seem to be taking considerably longer than other cases before the Gauhati High Court, even though these did not involve complex questions of law.   

We found an increase in the number of writ petitions filed before the Gauhati High Court in 2016, with the number of cases being close to double that of the previous year. The Government of Assam set up 64 Foreigners Tribunals in 2014, in addition to the then existing 36 Foreigners Tribunals. The spike in High Court cases may be because of the increase in the number of cases before the newly established Foreigners Tribunals.

The question of citizenship in Assam is nestled in a confusing tangle of documents, bureaucracy, and legal procedures which Foreigners Tribunals and the Gauhati High Court are tasked with resolving. Haidar Ali’s case aptly illustrates this. Ali was declared a foreigner on specious grounds even though he produced eleven documents supporting his claim of being an Indian citizen. This citizenship question is not merely a legal issue. It is also deeply embedded in the political history of Assam. Despite the end of the anti-foreigner agitation in 1985, the anxieties around the issue of migration from Bangladesh remain and have been exacerbated by the National Register of Citizens (NRC) process. Thus, given the political and popular pressure to find and deport foreigners, it is not surprising that the process followed by the Foreigners Tribunals so far has been arbitrary, biased, and unfair. These tribunals High Court needs to be mindful of the lived experiences of identity documentation to avoid an overly legalistic approach in the interests of justice. This issue acquires additional significance in the current context with 19 lakh people excluded from NRC whose cases will get referred to Foreigners Tribunals. Business as usual cannot go on. The process of adjudication of the claims of the persons excluded from the NRC needs to be shorn of the politics that has characterized the process so far and be molded into a fairer and less arbitrary process.   

Gauhati High Court on the issue of Res Judicata in Foreigners’ Tribunal Proceedings

This research note is part of Parichay’s ongoing project to study, track, and publish key propositions and latest developments in citizenship law and adjudication in India. This note was prepared by Sitamsini Cherukumalli and edited by Arunima Nair.

I. Background


Res judicata is a principle of law which states that the final decision given by a competent court on a matter between the same parties is binding, and cannot be put to litigation again. It is enshrined in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It was held by Gauhati High Court in Musstt. Amina Khatun vs. Union of India and Ors. [(2018) 4 Gauhati Law Reports 643] that the principle of res judicata, as articulated by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, would not apply in proceedings instituted under the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, since the Foreigners’ Tribunal was not a Court, and the proceedings could not be said to be judicial proceedings.

However, the Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India & Ors [(2019) 6 SCC 604] considered, among other questions, the nature of a Foreigners’ Tribunal proceeding. It held that the opinions given by the Foreigners’ Tribunal were quasi-judicial and not administrative in nature, because such orders by the Foreigners’ Tribunals had civil consequences. It elaborated on the difference at para 23:

The opinion by the Foreigners Tribunal is a quasi-judicial order and not an administrative order. The expression ‘quasi-judicial order’ means a verdict in writing which determines and decides contesting issues and questions by a forum other than a court. The determination has civil consequences. Explaining the meaning of quasi-judicial body in Indian National Congress (I) vs. Institute of Social Welfare & Ors (2002) 5 SCC 685, it was held that when anybody has a legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and a duty to act judicially, such body of persons constitute a quasi-judicial body and decision given by them is a quasi-judicial decision. It would also be a quasi-judicial order if the statute empowers an authority to decide the lis not between the two contesting parties but also when the decision prejudicially affects the subject as against the authority, provided that the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. Further, what differentiates an administrative act from the quasi-judicial act is that a quasi- judicial body is required to make an enquiry before arriving at a conclusion. In addition, an administrative authority is the one which is dictated by policy and expediency whereas a quasi-judicial authority is required to act according to the rules.

II. Gauhati High Court judgments applying Abdul Kuddus in FT cases

Several recent Gauhati High Court orders and judgments have applied Abdul Kuddus to petitions challenging individuals’ second references to FTs after having been declared Indian citizens in a previous FT proceeding. The Jahir Ali v. Union of India and Ors. [WP (C) No. 3402/2020] judgment was given by the Court on 3-3-2021, in response to a writ challenging an order given by the Foreigners’ Tribunal (1st) Mangaldai, Assam in 2018 declaring the petitioner to be a foreigner, despite an earlier order from 2015 by the very same Foreigners’ Tribunal declaring him to be an Indian National. In the 2018 order, the Tribunal held that the principle of res judicata will not apply in a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946, went into the merits of the case again, and found that the Petitioner had not adduced satisfactory evidence.

The Gauhati High Court held in Jahir Ali that as correct as the Tribunal might have been in following the ratio of Amina Khatun (supra) at that time, it was no longer tenable in light of the Abdul Kuddus judgment. They declined to get into the merits of the case or the quality of the evidence adduced, and reiterated that the earlier decision of the Foreigners’ Tribunal declaring the Petitioner to be an Indian would have a binding effect, given that the opinion rendered by a Foreigners’ Tribunal is a quasi-judicial order and not an administrative one. The Court further said that the Foreigners’ Tribunal cannot go into the merits of an earlier order given on the question as they are not exercising an appellate or review jurisdiction.

By applying the principle of res judicata, the Court remanded the matter and directed the concerned Tribunal to only look into the question of whether the present petitioner is the same person in favour of whom the earlier 2015 FT order declaring him to be an Indian national was passed. If found to be the same person, the case is to be dropped and the petitioner is to be “set at liberty without any condition.”

 In Alal Uddin v. Union of India and Ors. [WP (C) 3172/2020], the petitioner had been proceeded  against twice by the same Foreigners’ Tribunal (2nd) in Nagaon, with the Tribunal first declaring the petitioner as an Indian citizen in 2008 and then subsequently declaring him a foreigner in the impugned order from 2019. The petitioner had contested the maintainability of the second reference before the Tribunal by pleading that Abdul Kuddus would bar the second set of proceedings. The Tribunal rejected this contention by proclaiming that Abdul Kuddus was delivered in the context of Abdul Kuddus’ inclusion in the NRC, and is thus inapplicable to the petitioner’s case. The Gauhati High Court in a judgment dated 12-03-2021 disagreed and held that the Tribunal’s interpretation was incorrect. The bench reiterated that Abdul Kuddus explicitly discussed the legal implications of Sarbananda Sonowal Iand II [(2005) 5 SCC 665 and (2007) 1 SCC 174 respectively] and the nature of Foreigners’ Tribunals, especially that they are quasi-judicial authorities whose orders would operate as res judicata. The Court thus set aside the 2019 order by the Nagaon (2nd) Tribunal, and held that the previous Tribunal order from 2008 declaring the petitioner to be an Indian citizen will stand.

Similarly in Bulbuli Bibi v. Union of India [WP (C) 7810/2019], in a judgment rendered on 22-03-2021, the Court reinstated the petitioner’s first FT order from 2013 that held her to be an Indian citizen and set aside the subsequent FT reference from 2017 declaring her to be a foreigner. Although the two reports of the Government Verification Officer in the two references had inconsistencies in the names of the petitioner’s husband and father, the Court opined that these discrepancies are minor and it was clear that it was the same person, i.e. the petitioner, who had been proceeded against twice. By applying Abdul Kuddus,  the Court held that the second 2017 FT order is hit by res judicata and barred.

III. Table of Judgments from Gauhati High Court post-Abdul Kuddus (chronologically descending from latest first)

S.NoName and CitationDate of JudgementJudge(s) NamesRelevant Extracts
1Md. Abdul Syed v. Union of India  

WP(C) 2447/2021
8-4-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra SaikiaLearned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been proceeded twice and, as such, the second proceeding will be hit by the principle of res judicata as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 6 SCC 604.   Registry will call for the records in respect of Case No.BNC/FT/609/2016 from the Foreigners Tribunal, Tezpur 5th, Biswanath Chariali, Biswanath, Assam.   Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has not yet been detained on the strength of the impugned order dated 07.12.2019 passed in Case No.BNC/FT/609/2016 by the Member, Foreigners Tribunal, Tezpur 5th, Biswanath Chariali, Biswanath, Assam.   In that view of the matter, in the meantime, the petitioner, if not already arrested, may not be arrested and deported from India. However, the petitioner shall appear before the Superintendent of Police (Border), Biswanath within 15 (fifteen) days from today, who may obtain necessary information and documentation as required under the rules from the petitioner for securing his presence. On such appearance, the petitioner shall furnish a bail bond of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) with one local surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the said authority in connection with the aforesaid Case No.BNC/FT/609/2016, whereafter, the petitioner shall be allowed to remain on bail. The concerned Superintendent of Police (Border), Biswanath shall also take steps for capturing the fingerprints and biometrics of the iris of the petitioner, if so advised. The petitioner also shall not leave the jurisdiction of Biswanath district without furnishing the details of the place of destination and necessary information including contact number to the Superintendent of Police (Border), Biswanath.
2Ramesha Khatun v. Union of India  

WP(C) 2451/2021
8-4-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra SaikiaLearned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been proceeded twice and, as such, the second proceeding will be hit by the principle of res judicata as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 6 SCC 604.   Registry will call for the records in respect of F.T. Case No.122/F/15 from the Foreigners Tribunal No.2, Dhubri, Assam.   Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has not yet been detained on the strength of the impugned order dated 28.02.2020 passed in F.T. Case No.122/F/15 by the Member, Foreigners Tribunal No.2, Dhubri, Assam.   In that view of the matter, in the meantime, the petitioner, if not already arrested, may not be arrested and deported from India. However, the petitioner shall appear before the Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri within 15(fifteen) days from today, who may obtain necessary information and documentation as required under the rules from the petitioner for securing her presence. On such appearance, the petitioner shall furnish a bail bond of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) with one local surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the said authority in connection with the aforesaid F.T. Case No.122/F/15, whereafter, the petitioner shall be allowed to remain on bail. The concerned Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri shall also take steps for capturing the fingerprints and biometrics of the iris of the petitioner, if so advised. The petitioner also shall not leave the jurisdiction of Dhubri district without furnishing the details of the place of destination and necessary information including contact number to the Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri.
3Must. Afia Khatun v. Union of India  

WP(C) 1297/2020
31-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra Saikia[6] Be that as it may, perhaps the Tribunal could not have proceeded with the matter if it was found that the present petitioner is the same person, who was proceeded earlier in Case No.FT/H/106/2014, in view of the law laid down by Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 6 SCC 304, as the subsequent proceeding will be hit by principle of res- judicata and as such, any subsequent initiation of proceeding against the same person will be impermissible.   [8] Considering the above, we are also of the view that apprehension of the petitioner can be dispelled if the Tribunal examines whether the present petitioner is the same person who was proceeded earlier, for which the petitioner would produce and adduce necessary evidence in that regard before the Tribunal. However, we make it clear that the said examination by the Tribunal would be only for the purpose of finding out as to whether the present petitioner, Musstt.Afia Khatun @ Musstt. Afia Khatoon, W/o Samsul Hoque aged about 42 years is the same person or not, who was proceeded in earlier case i.e. in Case No.FT/H/106/2014 before the Foreigners Tribunal, Hojai, Sankardev Nagar. If the Foreigners Tribunal on hearing of the parties is satisfied that the present petitioner is the same person, who was proceeded in Case No.FT/H/106/2014 before the Foreigners Tribunal, Hojai, Sankardev Nagar, the Tribunal will not proceed further with the present proceeding in F.T.(D) Case Nol.1276/2015 and close the same on the strength of the earlier opinion dated 26.06.2014 by holding the petitioner not to be a foreigner, but an Indian as the second proceeding will be hit by the principle of res- judicata as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus (Supra). However, if it is found that the present petitioner is not same, the Foreigners Tribunal will proceed with the matter in accordance with law.
4Md. Sahar Ali. v. Union of India  

WP(C) 2105/2021
25-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Manish Choudhury[3] It has been submitted that in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Abdul Kuddus vs Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604 , as the principle of res- judicata is applicable in the proceeding before the Foreigners Tribunal, any subsequent initiation of proceeding against the same person will be impermissible. The petitioner submits that accordingly he filed an application before the aforesaid Tribunal on 23.11.2020 praying for not proceeding with the present proceeding initiated against the petitioner by claiming to be the same person in favour of whom the Foreigners Tribunal No.1, Barpeta had earlier on 16.01.2017 given a favourable opinion. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the matter is now pending before the same Tribunal. However, learned counsel for the petitioner apprehends that the matter may be proceeded on merit about his citizenship.   [5] We are of the view that apprehension of the petitioner is not warranted as the Tribunal can examine the petitioner as well as the original documents related to him as to whether the petitioner is the same person who was proceeded earlier. However, we make it clear that the said examination would be only for the purpose of finding out as to whether the present petitioner, Md. Sahar Ali @ Shar Ali S/o Rabi Uddin @ Rab Udin aged about 52 years is the same person or not, who was proceeded in earlier case i.e. in F.T. Case No.226/2016. If the Foreigners Tribunal on hearing of the parties is satisfied that the present petitioner is the same person, who was proceeded in F.T. case no.226/2016, the Tribunal will not proceed further with the present proceeding in F.T. Case No.387/2018 and close the same on the strength of the earlier opinion dated 16.01.2017 by holding the petitioner not to be a foreigner, but an Indian as the second proceeding will be hit by the principle of res-judicata as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus (Supra). However, if it is found that the present petitioner is not same, the Foreigners Tribunal will proceed with the matter in accordance with law.
5Md. Mahar Uddin v. Union of India  

WP(C) 3128/2017
23-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Manish Choudhury[25] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus Vs. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604 has already held that principle of res-judicata is applicable in a proceeding before the Foreigners Tribunal. However, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that, there are instances where proceedings have been reinitiated against the same person, inspite of the person being already declared an Indian. Thus, initiating a subsequent investigation and making another reference and initiating a proceeding again before a Tribunal can be avoided if such data are properly maintained, which will help detect such unnecessary duplication of efforts.   [26] It has been further observed that some of the proceedees though hail originally from one district go to another district for their livelihoods and are proceeded in a different district away from their hometowns. Thus, they face serious disadvantages about gathering evidences and producing witnesses in support of their claim in the remotely located Tribunals. Maintenance of such proper data can help proper investigation, reference and proceeding in the appropriate district to avoid such hardships.   [27] Accordingly, we deemed it appropriate to direct the State Government to examine the feasibility of applying Information and Communication Technology to the proceedings before the Foreigners Tribunals, to maintain and preserve data, to make the functioning of the Foreigners Tribunal more efficient, transparent and systematic. It has been stated at the Bar that a large number of cases of more than 1.4 lakhs of suspected illegal immigrants are pending before the Foreigners Tribunals and many more persons are being investigated for reference. Thus, use of Information and Communication Technology will certainly enhance efficacy, help proper management of the huge number of cases and avoid duplicating and conflicting opinions.
6Bulbuli Bibi v. Union of India  

WP (C) 7810/2019
22-03-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ.  Soumitra Singh[7] Thus it appears that the only difference or inconsistency is about the difference is the name of the husband, viz. Nazim and Najimuddin. We feel that this difference is minor and not substantial and hence can be ignored. Similarly, the name of the father of the proceedee has been recorded as late Giapuddin Fakir in the first proceeding and in the second proceeding, it has been recorded as Giyas Fakir. We are also of the opinion that these are minor variations, and as such the same can be ignored.   [8] From the above, it appears that it was the same person who was sought to be proceeded against. However the finding given in the first proceeding under Case no. K/FT/D/771/11(B/KJR/D, voter/2010/164) vide opinion dated 30.09.2013 that the proceedee is not a foreigner of 1966-1971 stream and her name should not have been recorded in the ‘D’ voters list. The said finding given in earlier opinion dated on 30.09.2013 has not been interfered with and has attained finality. Accordingly, we are of the view that the subsequent finding opinion given by the Foreigners’ Tribunal in K/FT/D/714/10, (No. B/KJR/D.voter/2010/108, dated 23.12.2010) rendered 18.08.2017 is barred by principle of res-judicata, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment reported in Abdul Kuddus vs Union of India, (2019) Vol. 6 SCC 604, that in the proceedings before the Foreigners’ Tribunal, the principle of res-judicata is applicable.
7Sabiran Khatun v. Union of India  

WP(C)/8372/2019
16-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra SaikiaLearned counsel for the petitioner submits that the subsequent proceeding initiated by Foreigners Tribunal No.2, Kamrup (M), Guwahati in FT (D.V.) Case No.457/2018 is hit by principles of res judicata in view of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604 . Accordingly, since the petitioner was earlier opined to be an Indian Citizen by the Foreigners’ Tribunal No.1, Dhubri, in F.T. Case No.1076/D/11, the present proceeding cannot lie being barred by the principles of res judicata. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No.2, Kamrup(M) is not maintainable. We are also, prima facie, satisfied that in Abdul Kuddus (Supra) case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the Foreigners’ Tribunal is a quasi judicial body and the principles of res judicata will apply.   In view of above, we are prima facie satisfied that the order passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No.2, Kamrup(M) in FT (D.V.) Case No.457/2018 on 14.10.2019 needs to be stayed for further consideration and accordingly, the proceedings in FT (D.V.) Case No.457/2018 shall remain stayed until further orders.
8Alal Uddin v. Union of India and Ors.  

WP (C) 3172/2020
12-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra Saikia[4] We are, however, unable to agree with the said opinion of the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No.II, Nagaon passed on 30.09.2019. Though, in Abdul Kuddus (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the matter relating to inclusion of the name in the NRC, yet at the same time the Hon’ble Supreme Court had also considered the provisions of Foreigners’ (Tribunals) Order, 1964 and had discussed about the various legal implications arising out of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 as well as Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 174 and elaborately discussed about the procedure for disposal of such matter by the learned Tribunal under the Foreigners’ (Tribunals) Order, 1964 and in that context it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Tribunal functions as a quasi-judicial authority and it would be incorrect to hold that the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal and/or the consequential order passed by the Registering Authority would not operate as res judicata.   [6] Accordingly, the present petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 30.09.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal (2nd) Nagaon in F.T. Case no.1082/2011. As a result, the order passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal (2nd), Nagaon on 19.08.2008 shall stand revived and the petitioner’s status as an Indian citizen in terms of the earlier opinion passed by the learned Foreigner’s Tribunal (2nd), Nagaon, on19.08.2008 will stand.
9Jahir Ali vs. Union of India  

WP (C) No. 3402/2020
3-3-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra Saikia[15] Be that as it may, since we have already held that the principle of res judicata will apply in view of the decision in Abdul Kuddus (supra), the Foreigners’ Tribunal in the present instant proceeding cannot re-examine the legality or otherwise of the opinion rendered earlier by the Foreigners’ Tribunal, except to ascertain as to whether the petitioner was the same person against whom the Foreigners’ Tribunal in F.T. Case No.771/2012 had given its opinion. If it is found on consideration of the materials on record and after hearing the parties that the present petitioner was indeed the same person against whom the Foreigners’ Tribunal had given its opinion in the earlier proceeding in F.T.Case No.771/2012, the present proceeding will be barred by application of principle of res judicata.   [16] Accordingly, for the reasons recorded above, we allow this petition by remanding the matter to the concerned learned Tribunal to consider the case of the petitioner afresh by giving him an opportunity to prove that the present petitioner, namely, Jahir Ali, aged about 52 years, S/O Nesar Ali @ Mesar Ali,R/O Ward No.6, PO & PS-Mangaldai, District-Darrang, Assam, is one and the same person in whose favour an opinion was earlier given by the same Tribunal on 15.07.2015 in F.T. Case.
10Musst. Fulbanu Nessa v. Union of India  

WP(C) 725/2021
15-2-2021HMJ. N. Kotiswar Singh, HMJ. Soumitra SaikiaAccordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the subsequent review and the opinion rendered by the Foreigners’ Tribunal, Diphu, on 16.03.2020 is ex facie illegal apart from the fact that in the present case the principle of res judicata applies as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2019) 6 SCC 604.   It has been submitted that the petitioner is in custody since 17.03.2020 on the strength of the aforesaid order dated 16.03.2020 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal, Diphu.  On perusal of the materials available on records, we are prima facie satisfied that the petitioner has made out a case for her release on bail and suspension of the order dated 16.03.2020 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal, Diphu.  
11Sabita Das vs The Union Of India  

WP(C) 182/2020  
12-2-2021HMJ. Michael ZothankhumaThe plea was specifically taken before the Foreigners Tribunal-II, Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur that the petitioner has been already declared as not a foreigner. Ext.-9, which, however was not accepted by the Tribunal. It has been submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Kuddus Vs. Union of India, reported in 2019 (6) SCC 604 has held that the principle of res judicata will also apply in the proceedings before the Foreigners Tribunal. The matter needs examination. We are prima facie satisfied that the impugned order needs to be stayed.  
12Rejia Khatun v. Union of India  

WP(C) 2811/2020
31-8-2020HMJ. Manojit Bhuyan, HMJ. Hitesh Kumar SarmaPetitioner has put to challenge the proceedings in FT Case No.2854/2012, pending before the Foreigners’ Tribunal Tezpur (1 st), Assam, primarily on the ground that in an earlier proceeding i.e. in FT Case No.14/2016, she was declared as not a foreigner. Reliance is placed on the principle of res- judicata by making reference to the case in Abdul Kuddus vs. Union of India and Others (Civil Appeal No.5012/2019), reported in (2019) 6 SCC 604.   Issue Notice.   No fresh steps are required to be taken as all respondents are represented. Heard on the interim prayer.   Pending disposal of the writ petition, the proceeding in FT Case No.2854/2012 pending before the Foreigners’ Tribunal Tezpur (1st), Assam shall remain stayed.
13Basanti Sarkar v. Union of India and Ors.  

WP(C) 6768/2019
18-12-2019HMJ. Suman Shyam, HMJ. Parthivjyothi SaikiaThis writ petition is directed against the final order and opinion dated 31/07/2019 passed by the Foreigner’s Tribunal(2), Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur, in connection with FT Case No. 262/2007.   Mr.Bhowmik submits that besides being perverse, the impugned order is also barred under the principles of res judicata since the petitioner has already been declared as an Indian citizen by the Foreigner’s Tribunal by order dated 21/04/2010.   From the perusal of the materials on record, we find that by order dated 21/04/2010 passed in connection with LFT-II(D) case No. 274/2008, the learned Tribunal had declared that the petitioner is not a foreigner. The said order was passed after taking note of the documents including voters’ list of 1966 produced by the petitioner, which contains the names of the father and mother of the petitioner.   Under the circumstances, we are of the prima facie view that the subsequent opinion of the learned Foreigner’s Tribunal is untenable in the eye of law.
14Sribas Biswas v. Union of India  

WP(C) 495/2019
1-2-2019HMJ. Achintya Malla Bujor Barua, HMJ. Ajit BorthakurThe petitioner raises an issue that two parallel reference proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, where one of them resulted in judgment and order dated 30.05.2014 in FT.K.D.V Case No.8716/2011, wherein he had been declared to be a citizen of India. Upon the said fact being brought to the notice of the Tribunal in the other proceeding being FT.K.1746/2017, the Tribunal by the order dated 11.10.2018 by relying on the pronouncement of this Court in Amina Khatun –vs Union of India and others, reported in 2018 (3) GLT 1took the view that as the principle of res-judicata is not applicable, therefore, the other proceeding is maintainable.   An issue for consideration would arise as to whether a parallel proceeding in contradistinction with that of a subsequent proceeding would be maintainable merely by following the principle laid down in Amina Khatun (supra) that the principle of res-judicata is not applicable in respect of a reference under the Foreigners Tribunal Order, 1964.   In view of the above, in the interim, it is provided that further proceeding in the FTK No.1746/2017 before the Foreigners Tribunal No.4, Kamrup (M) be stayed.
15Maran Das v. Union of India

WP(C) 477/2019
1-2-2019HMJ. Achintya Malla Bujor Barua, HMJ. Ajit BorthakurThe petitioner raises an issue that two parallel reference proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, where one of them resulted in judgment and order dated 25.01.2017 in FT.K.D.V Case No.279/2016, wherein he had been declared to be a citizen of India. Upon the said fact being brought to the notice of the Tribunal in the other proceeding being FT.K.84/2018, the Tribunal by the order dated 11.10.2018 by relying on the pronouncement of this Court in Amina Khatun –vs Union of India and others, reported in 2018 (3) GLT 1 took the view that as the principle of res-judicata is not applicable, therefore, the other proceeding is maintainable.   An issue for consideration would arise as to whether a parallel proceeding in contradistinction with that of a subsequent proceeding would be maintainable merely by following the principle laid down in Amina Khatun (supra) that the principle of res-judicata is not applicable in respect of a reference under the Foreigners Tribunal Order, 1964.   In view of the above, in the interim, it is provided that further proceeding in the FTK No.84/2018 before the Foreigners Tribunal No.4, Kamrup (M) be stayed.

This note was last updated on 11 May 2021.

Case Note: Md. Misher Ali v Union of India & Ors.

This case note is part of Parichay’s ongoing project to study, track, and publish key propositions and latest developments in citizenship law and adjudication in India. This note was prepared by Sitamsini Cherukumalli.

Full case name: Md. Misher Ali @ Meser Ali v Union of India & Ors

Case No.: CA 1058-1059/2021

Brief Facts:

A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (Border) Sivsagar district against the Petitioner in Police Enquiry No. 135/10, alleging that he is an illegal migrant who entered India after 24th March 1971 without valid documents. A notice of the subsequent Foreigners’ Tribunal proceedings was served to the Petitioner “by hanging” the same at his temporary address in the district of Sivsagar. No attempt was made by the investigating agencies or the process server to issue a notice at his permanent address in Dhubri district, Assam.

Following the service of notice at his temporary address, the Foreigners’ Tribunal, Jorhat, Assam, pronounced an ex-parte order in FT Case No. SVR/310/2010, holding that the Petitioner was indeed a foreign national on 22nd March 2018. The Petitioner has since been in custody since 15th May 2019. The Petitioner’s appeal as well as his review petition against the FT order were dismissed by the Gauhati High Court, following which he has approached the Supreme Court of India.

Issues

  1. Was the notice issued to the Petitioner in the FT Case No. SVR/310/2010 in accordance with Paragraph 3(5)(f) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964?
  2. Is the Petitioner barred from approached the Supreme Court of India under 3A of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964, which grants a time period of 30 days for the Aggrieved to move proceedings against an ex-parte order?

Relevant Laws:

  • Paragraph 3(5)(f) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964

If the proceedee has changed the place of residence or place of work, without intimation to the investigating agency, the process server shall affix a copy of the notice on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in which the proceedee ordinarily resides or last resided or reportedly resided or personally worked for gain or carries on business, and shall return the original to the Foreigners Tribunal from which it was issued with a report endorsed thereon or annexed thereto stating that he has so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which he did so, and the name and address of the person (if any) by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed.

  • 3A of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 [Renumbered to 3C from 3A by G.S.R. 409(E). dt. 30-5-2019 (w.e.f. 4-6-2019)]

3C (1) Where the Foreigners Tribunal has passed an ex parte order for non-appearance of the proceedee and he or she has sufficient cause for not appearing before the Foreigners Tribunal, it may on the application of the proceedee, if filed within thirty days of the said order, set aside its ex parte order and decide the case accordingly.


Arguments of the Petitioner

  1. The Petitioner contended that the authorities had knowledge of his permanent address, in spite of which there was no attempt made to serve a notice of the proceedings at the permanent address despite being aware that this omission goes against the principles of natural justice.

Arguments of the Respondent-State

  1. The notice was hung outside the door in pursuance of Para 3(5)(f) of the Foreigner’s (Tribunals) Order. If there is a change in the place of residence or work without intimation to the investigating agency, the process server is authorised to serve the notice at the place where an individual ordinarily resides, and in doing so, the authorities have complied with the aforementioned provision.
  2. The Petitioner is barred from approaching the Supreme Court as it contravenes 3A of the Foreigner’s Tribunals Order, which gives a period of 30 days to move proceedings against an ex-parte decree passed by the FTs.

Ruling

  1. The Authorities were aware of the Petitioner’s permanent residence. This is reflected in several documents, including the impugned order of the Foreigners Tribunal; a statement by the Appellant which was recorded by the Senior Inspector of Police in 2010; and the interrogation report before the Inspector of Police dated 22 January 2010 – all the aforementioned documents make note of the Petitioner’s permanent address being in Dhubri district, Assam.
  2. Paragraph 3(5)(f) deals with situations where a proceedee has changed his place of residence or work without intimation to the investigating agency, and this provision is not attracted when it is proved that the investigating agency had knowledge of the proceedee’s permanent address.
  3. Paragraph 3A (now Paragraph 3C), prescribing a period of thirty days for a person to move proceedings against an ex-parte order by demonstrating sufficient cause for their non-appearance is only applicable when notice has been duly served. When it has been held by the application of facts that the notice was not duly served, the thirty-day limit prescribed by Paragraph 3C cannot be attracted.
  4. The ex-parte order of the Foreigners’ Tribunal and the dismissal of the review petition by the Gauhati High Court dated 6th December 2019 are set aside. Foreigners’ Tribunal, Jorhat, Assam is ordered to restore Case No. FT/SVR/310/20

Citizenship and the Eastern Partition

This is a guest post by Malavika Prasad. She is an advocate and doctoral fellow at the NALSAR University of Law. She has served as an advocate in the Supreme Court of India and other courts. Presently, she is also a senior editor at Law and Other Things.


 “For most people who live alongside it, the border between India and Bangladesh is a chimera.”

– Urvashi Butalia[*]

On the day the Indian republic came into being, one could be an Indian citizen in two key ways. Those with domicile in free India were eligible for citizenship if born in free India, or to Indian parents, or if ordinarily resident in territory that was now Indian in the past five years.[1]  Those without domicile in free India, being ordinarily resident outside British India and the princely states,[2] could be citizens if they had a connection to India by birth.[3]

However, Partition had created a third category of people: those who lacked Indian domicile despite being linked to British India by birth and residence because their permanent homes were now in Pakistan. For them, the Constitution made an exception from the general rule. If they came to India before 19 July 1948, they had to have resided in India since their arrival to establish an intention to be an Indian citizen. If they came to India after 19 July 1948, or had gone to Pakistan and sought to return to India on permits for resettlement or permanent return, registration as a citizen after a minimum of six months’ stay in India was necessary.[4]

These provisions betray no consideration of the unique circumstances of Partition on the East. This piece is a brief exploration of how this came to be. Closely reading these debates reveals that the citizenship crisis of the East is a crisis that was incipient and looming even when the Constitution was framed.

Histories of Eastern Migration

The Boundary Commission drew the border between India and Pakistan over just a few weeks, both in the West and the East.  Helmed by an Englishman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe (whose ignorance of the soon-to-be borderlands was taken to be a guarantee of impartiality), the top-down partition of India was unmindful of the social histories of migration in Eastern India.

After the British annexed Assam in 1826, they acquired land on a large scale by displacing locals to run tea, jute, oil and other enterprises.[5] Tea workers were recruited from Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and other regions[6] and settled in Assam.[7] These labourers were deliberately isolated from the locals at the behest of the tea industry management.[8] Likewise, the low-lying floodplains of the Brahmaputra were used for cultivation of jute, for which the settlement of East Bengali peasants was encouraged.[9] The peasants moved upstream along the Brahmaputra and eastwards into Assam from eastern Bengal in such large numbers that they outnumbered the locals.[10] As social networks in the region grew, (largely Muslim) migrant labourers started coming on their own[11] and did not face resistance till the last two decades of colonial rule.[12]

With the evolution of transportation technology towards achieving “imperatives of the empire” such as “security, profit, and cheap but safe governance”, movement of labour became easier.[13] Much of the highly localized migration was ecologically determined by the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers flooding fields or swallowing up islands[14] as they cut new courses to the sea[15] — a phenomenon that continues to determine micro-migration to the present day.[16] The economic depression and the Second World War only heightened the desperation of these labourers as well as the need for labour.[17]Of course, white-collar migration for administrative and clerical jobs serving the Raj also commenced over time, with large numbers of Hindu Bengalis heading to Orissa, Bihar, Bombay, United Provinces, the Punjab, and Assam.[18]

To give you a sense of the numbers, by 1931, scholars note that“…6 million persons had moved within and from the greater Bengal region, a number already twice as large as the entire Indian diaspora worldwide  in 1947 and almost twice the size of the Chinese diaspora in the USA in 2010.[19] By 1931, the Bengali-speaking population in Assam was double the number of Assamese-speaking persons.[20] In Tripura alone, scholars have noted that the indigenous tribes had stopped being a “decisive majority” on the eve of partition due to Bengali migration.[21] Given their huge socioeconomic and cultural consequences,[22] these migrations cannot be overlooked merely because international borders were not crossed.[23] Moreover, this internal migration with a five decade history was suddenly transformed into an international one when the eastern border was drawn.[24]

Impact of the Eastern Partition  

Dominant narratives of the eastern partition focus only on linguistic and religious identities of migrants and refugees. However, even wherethe border did indeed separateBengali majority areas from others(such as in Tripura and Assam)“…it was often a case of Bengalis (both Muslims and Hindus) on one side and non-Bengali Christians or Buddhists on the other…[25]

Further examination also reveals the caste, class, and gendered impacts of the eastern Partition. For instance, in West Bengal, the first to arrive were upper caste and upper and middle class Hindus of East Bengal. Dalit refugees came only after the riots of 1949 and 1950.[26]

The landed and middle class were motivated by the fear of violence, the loss of social status, and the feeling that they may be better off in a land of ‘their own people’. On the other hand, the peasant class only moved when faced with “extreme violence or …intolerable hardship”, such as in the communal violence in 1949 and 1950.[27] While peasants were three quarters of the Hindu population of East Bengal, they were only forty percent of the Hindu refugees in West Bengal.[28] 

Among upper caste refugees, women occupied a position of “power and powerlessness in a national context.”[29] In public imagery, they were depicted in the public sphere,[30] which led to a narrative of agency. However, many such women were actually thrust into land grabbing for squatting, and later, into (sometimes violent) political agitations against eviction.[31]

In literature, the squalor in the Sealdah station – as refugees awaited allocation to a government refugee camp – forms the turning point for upper caste women getting into politics. However, Sealdah is barely a footnote in the ‘legacies of vulnerability’ inherited by the Dalit women refugee.[32] While upper caste women could rebuild their lives and look back upon the trauma of refugeehood, Dalit women refugees were consigned to a refugeehood that continues to the present day.[33] While upper caste women entering the labour market was seen as a “feminist triumph”,[34] Dalit women – having always been involved in wage labour – continued to do so post Partition, only without the family as a support system in their second full shift of domestic labour.[35]

Rehabilitation schemes entailing land and loans was implicitly designed for the able-bodied male refugee. For “unattached” women, rehabilitation came only in the form of training for (gendered and often low-paying) vocations, with the aim of keeping them occupied.[36] By 1957, when a comprehensive rehabilitation policy was introduced, women stood marginalized – along with families that lacked able-bodied men.[37] They were seen as economically non-productive, perennially dependent, and unworthy of rehabilitation but in need of relief.[38] Thus, the right to a social identity was taken away from women refugees who were not “attached” to a heteropatriarchal family of some type.

Outside of Bengal, the binaries of religion (which were particularly nationalistic) and language (which privileged the border between East and West Bengal where “non-Muslim” did indeed overwhelmingly mean “Hindus”) gave way to a deeper complexity along ethnic lines.[39] For instance, the border sliced through Garo[40] and Rakhaing communities and their trade and solidarity networks. Yet, the terms on which Partition was executed, flattened the vocabulary for these gender, ethnic, caste, and class contexts into the simplistic and reductive categories of linguistic and religious identity. This oversimplification of the communities of the Eastern border continues in popular discourse to the present day.

The Resulting Citizenship Question

When citizenship was debated in the Constituent Assembly, the eastern border and its communities as well as the many histories of migration prior to Partition, barely came up. In fact, the migration in the West almost exclusively fed the concept of citizenship that was encoded into the Constitution.[41] The reason the Assembly was so preoccupied with the refugee crisis on the Western border was that it was seen as intractable, unlike that on the East.

The consensus between the two dominions at the time had been to refrain from exchanging their minority populations, except in Punjab.[42] They had arranged instead to maintain reciprocity[43] — in that each nation would treat its religious minority in the same way as the other would treat its minority, while the borders would remain porous.[44] However, the commitment to reciprocity started breaking down as the Indian government decided to aid the evacuation of Sikhs and Hindus from Sind in the wake of the January 1948 Karachi riots.[45] Soon after, the border came to be regulated through the permit system, to tackle what was perceived to be a “one way traffic” to India – of Muslims.[46]The heavy handed enforcement of the permit system[47] was seen as necessary because of the economic consideration of how to rehabilitate returning Muslims who had once fled India; their homes had already been allotted, under evacuee property laws, to Hindu and Sikh refugees who came in from Pakistan.[48]

In comparison, no permit policy was introduced to regulate the Eastern migration. Since there were significant economic interests at stake for West Bengal in permitting continued migration,[49] it was hoped that the reciprocity arrangements would persuade “migrants to stay in place.”[50] When refugees continued to pour in nevertheless, the political leadership viewed the influx as fundamentally reversible.[51] Thus, the Eastern migration fell by the wayside of the Constituent Assembly’s attention.[52]

The limited context in which the Eastern migration was considered in the Assembly was at the behest of R K Chaudhury, for two classes of people. First were the migrants from East Bengal who had come to West Bengal or Assam “out of fear of disturbance in the future or from a sense of insecurity”.[53] The second were those who belonged to Sylhet[54] when it was a part of Assam, and thus continued to reside in Assam even after Sylhet was partitioned and restored to East Bengal. The partition of Sylhet caused mass migrations of Sylhet’s Bengali Hindus[55] – who probably feared violence or unsettled livelihoods – to the Barak valley[56] and the princely state of Tripura.[57] Those who remained in Assam, Chaudhary pointed out, could not now be expected to return to East Bengal, even if their reasons for being in Assam to begin with were business or government employment.[58]

Sylheti workers, no doubt, were being cut off from Assam’s tea gardens as well as Calcutta’s merchant marine as they were viewed as “Pakistani” after Partition.[59] However, Chaudhury’s centering of Sylhet reveals a concern for only a particular demographic, of the many whose lives were upended by Partition. To put it plainly, he had no interest in enfranchising recent Muslim migrants to Assam.[60] In his view, at least some Muslims were being settled there by the Muslim League to shore up the state’s Muslim population (perhaps with the aim of having the entirety of Assam be assigned to East Bengal in partition[61]). Despite his advocacy, the framers of the Constitution were committed to the secular and universally framed citizenship provisions[62] even if they opened the door for a free-for-all migration to Assam.

The Looming Citizenship Crisis

The Constitution’s citizenship provisions came into effect on 26 November 1949. The eastern border came to be regulated by the passport system only in 1952.[63]

Migration, which was otherwise unremarkable in the Bengal delta, had become galvanised by Partition into a continuous process; displacement was now “an inescapable part of [their] reality”.[64]  In West Bengal alone, about 20-30 lakh refugees from East Bengal had settled there per the 1951 and 1961 census.[65] By July 1958, the state government decided it would house no more refugees in the state,[66] and forcibly movedthem – an overwhelming number of whom were Dalit – to camps in (non arable, non irrigated) lands outside the state.[67] Tripura saw about 5 lakh partition-refugees from East Bengal between 1947-1958; after suffering significant impacts on its local cultivation, land use and demographic patterns, the registration of refugees was stopped.[68] In Assam, members in the Lok Sabha contended that “that as many as 4 ½ lakhs of Muslims … [had] crossed the border … after the attainment of Independence.”[69] To allay old concerns about the exploitation of Assam, Parliament passed the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act  in 1950.[70]

When Parliament was considering the Citizenship Bill in 1955, the long-drawn migration induced by partition was yet to unfold. Once again, there were proposals to treat Hindu and Muslim refugees differentially in the citizenship law;[71] once again, the framers of the Act declined to do so. All refugees from Partition were eligible to be Indian citizens through a single secular, and neutrally applicable provision. They would have to register themselves as citizens under Section 5 of the Act. Tellingly, the law permitted citizenship by descent only through the male line – in keeping with the State’s apathy towards unattached women.

By the 1970s, the numbers of refugees in West Bengal had doubled to about 60 lakhs.[72] The mass movement of refugees into India[73] triggered by the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971 only aggravated the migration crisis.[74] Tripura’s tribals turned into a minority.[75] In Assam, a new crisis was brewing.

It was claimed that the influx of refugees had resulted in about 31 to 34% of the State’s population (about 50 lakh persons per the 1971 Census) being “foreigners”, and that a substantial number of them were even on the electoral rolls.[76] Championing this claim was the All Assam Students Union. Their agitation culminated in 1985 in the signing of the Assam Accord[77] – a political rapprochement between the central government and the Union stipulating that “a) all those who had migrated before 1966 would be treated as citizens; (b) those who had migrated between 1966 and 1971 could stay provided they put themselves through an official process of registration as foreigners; and (c) all those who migrated thereafter were simply illegal immigrants.”[78] Thus was born the 1985 amendment to the Citizenship Act by which the Indian citizen was defined in opposition to a “foreigner”.[79]

The Incipient and Looming Citizenship Crisis

A “foreigner” under the Foreigners Act, 1946 is “a person who is not a citizen of India”.[80] For this definition to be meaningful, the citizen needs to have a fixed meaning – with citizenship being tethered to the fact of birth or domicile. Only then can its photo-negative be the foreigner.

However, the top-down imposition of the Eastern border onto the many histories of migration in the region, at once transformed those who were once Indian into “foreigners”. Moreover, the many caste, gender, class, and ethnic impacts of Partition were papered over by the dominant political narratives on religious and linguistic lines. Ultimately, it was those who were rendered foreigners – by the creation of the Indian state and its dominant political narratives – that were sought to be kept out by the 1985 amendment.

This raises a question that ought to cause alarm. With the 1985 amendment, the existence of the foreigner constitutes and informs the definition of the citizen.[81] It appears then that the citizen in India, far from being a fixed and pre-defined entity, can be reified only in relation to the foreigner. If the citizen can be only understood informed by the foreigner, and the foreigner is inherently politically contingent, who really is an Indian citizen?

 


[*] Urvashi Butalia, The Nowhere People, Seminar 2003.

[1] Article 5 of the Constitution.

[2] Articles 6 and 7, as well as Article 8, use as their reference point, “India as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935 (as originally enacted)…”, which includes both British India as well as the princely states. See Section 311(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935: ““India” means British India together with all territories of any Indian Ruler under the suzerainty of His Majesty, all territories under the suzerainty of such an Indian Ruler, the tribal areas, and any other territories which His Majesty in Council may, from time to time, after ascertaining the views of the Federal Government and the Federal Legislature, declare to be part of India.”

[3] That is, they had to be born in British India or the princely states (or to parents or grandparents who were born there) and register themselves in the Indian consulate, signaling their intention to be Indian. See Article 8 of the Constitution..

[4] Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution of India.

[5] Walter Fernandes, IMDT Act and Immigration in North-Eastern India, The Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40(30) 3237-3240, 3239. Fernandes notes that tribal lands inherently were “community owned according to tribal customary law” while mainstream Indian laws recognized land as a private property right. Thus, the “disjunction between the systems” made the land susceptible to easy encroachment by immigrants whose only transferable skill was cultivation. Immigration, in Fernandes’ thesis, must be understood for the deeply economic issue it is, rather than being flattened into an ethnic or linguistic issue. Of the colonial project of dispossessing the indigenous communities of their land, Sanjib Baruah writes“…There were frequent attacks on the plantations by “tribesmen” protesting their dispossession during the early years of tea in Assam. Colonial writings portrayed them as marauding barbarians. The Inner Line… was an attempt to fence off the plantations and cordon off areas of clear, cemented colonial rule.” Sanjib Baruah, In the Name of the Nation: India and its Northeast (Stanford University Press, 2020), 31;

[6] The tea industry was “built on indentured labour from Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and other regions where the Permanent Settlement 1793 and the zamindari system had displaced people on a large scale”, writes Fernandes. Walter Fernandes, 3239.

[7] Sanjib Baruah(2020), 50 (footnotes omitted).

[8] Walter Fernandes, 3239.

[9] Sanjib Baruah (2020), 50.

[10] Claire Alexander, Joya Chatterji, Annu Jalais, The Bengal Diaspora Rethinking Muslim Migration, 39-40 (Routledge 2015). See also Mohammed Mahbubar Rahman and Willem van Schendel, I am Not a Refugee, Rethinking Partition Migration, Modern Asian Studies 37(3), 551-584, 582 fn71.

[11] Amalendu Guha records that in the first half of the 20th century, 85% of the landless immigrants from East Bengal to Assam alone were Muslim, despite the “line system” implemented to regulate the in-bound migrant communities, which changed the face of Assamese politics significantly. See generally Amalendu Guha, East Bengal Immigrants and Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani in Assam Politics, 1928-47, The Indian Economic & Social History Review13(4), 419–452. These Muslims of the Brahmaputra valley went on to adopt Assamese as their first language. Sanjib Baruah (2020) 53-54.

[12] Sanjib Baruah (2020) 50-51.

[13] Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais 26.

[14] See Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais, The Bengal Diaspora, 64-66, on mobile agriculturists from Malda and Chapai who routinely ‘lost their land to the river’, lived in bamboo huts that can be assembled and disassembled with ease, and capitalized on their years of acquired “mobility capital” to migrate after partition being “remarkably free of any ideological baggage committing them particularly to a nation, whether Pakistan, India, or Bangladesh.”

[15] Ibid.

[16] Rohini Mohan, Lakhs Of The Most Marginalised Women In Assam’s River Islands Risk Becoming Stateless, Huffington Post, 7 August 2018 https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2018/08/07/lakhs-of-the-most-marginalised-women-in-assam-s-river-islands-risk-becoming-stateless_a_23497234/

[17] Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais, 39-40.

[18] Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais, 32; Sanjib Baruah (2020), 51; Thongkholal Haokip, Inter Ethnic Relations in Meghalaya, Asian Ethnicity 15(3) (2014): 302-316, 305.

[19] Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais, 28 (footnotes omitted).

[20] Navine Murshid, Assam and the Foreigner Within, Asian Survey 56(3) 581-604, 599.

[21] Subir Bhaumik, Disaster in Tripura, Seminar 2002, https://www.india-seminar.com/2002/510/510%20subir%20bhaumik.htm, citing H.L. Chatterji, ‘Glimpses of Tripura’s History’, Tripura Review, 15 August 1972.

[22] See Madhumita Sengupta, Historiography of the Formation of Assamese Identity A Review, Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, 121-34 for a review of the literature on the consequences in Assam; Udayon Misra, Immigration and Identity Transformation in Assam, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34(21) (May 22-28, 1999), pp. 1264-1271.

[23] See generally, chapter 1 “Prehistories of mobility and immobility: The Bengal delta and the ‘eastern zone’ 1857-1947” in Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais.

[24] Willem van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland 192 (Anthem Press 2004) 210-211.

[25] Willem van Schendel, 47.

[26] “…Yet this was also when the refugee crisis assumed such “desperate proportions that Government officials were at a loss to find accommodation for their rehabilitation.” Dwaipayan Sen, The Decline of the Caste Question 219 (Cambridge University Press 2018); See also Sarbani Bannerjee, Different Identity Formations in Bengal Partition Narratives by Dalit Refugees, Interventions (2017), 2.

[27] See Joya Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India 1947-67, 111-118 (CUP 2007). See also Uditi Sen, Spinster Prostitute or Pioneer? Images of Refugee Women in Post- Partition Calcutta 3-6(European University Institute Working Papers 2011/34).

[28] Chatterji (2007) 118.

[29] Paulomi Chakraborty, The Refugee Woman Partition of Bengal, Gender and the Political 19 (OUP 2018).

[30] Uditi Sen, 7.

[31] Uditi Sen, 10-12.

[32] Ekata Bakshi, Marginal Women A Study of Partition-induced (1947) Forced Migration through the Lens of Caste and Labour in Vijaya Rao et al. (eds.), Displacement and Citizenship: Histories and Memories of Exclusion 138 (Tulika Books 2020).

[33] Ibid, 141.

[34] Uditi Sen, Citizen Refugees Forging the Indian Nation After Partition 238-39 (CUP 2018).

[35] Ekata Bakshi, 143 – 145.

[36] See Uditi Sen, 2018, Chapter 5.

[37] Uditi Sen, 8.

[38] Uditi Sen, 2018, 210 -218.

[39] Willem van Schendel, 47-48.

[40] S K Chaube points to the Garo areas of Mymensingh and Rangpur which went to East Bengal (and border present day Meghalaya), the Khasi regions of Sylhet, and the Kuki-chin areas of the Chittagong Hill tract. See S K Chaube, Hill Politics in North-east India 85-86 (Orient Blackswan 1999).Haokip, ibid.

[41] See Abhinav Chandrachud, Secularism and the Citizenship Amendment Act, Indian Law Review, 4(2) (2020) 138-162.

[42] Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia, 39-41(Columbia University Press, 2007).

[43] The Inter Dominion Agreement, 1948 stating that both India and Pakistan “are determined to take every possible step to discourage such exodus and to create such conditions as would check mass exodus in either direction, and would encourage and facilitate as far as possible the return of evacuees to their ancestral homes.” See Pallavi Raghavan, Animosity at Bay, 60 (Harper Collins 2020). Likewise, in 1950, the Nehru-Liaqat Pact was enacted. Pallavi Raghavan finds that “this was a remarkable agreement, making the governments, for the first time, formally accountable to one another for the welfare of their minorities.” Pallavi Raghavan, The Making of South Asia’s Minorities, EPW LI(21) May 2016, 45.

[44] Zamindar 71-72; See Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Statement on Partition Issues Between India and Pakistan, 12 December 1947, The Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report, Vol III, 1810, https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/760070/1/cald_01_12-12-1947.pdf#search=null%201947

[45] Zamindar, 53.

[46] Zamindar, 94. Through this system, those who sought to permanently relocate to India needed a permit for permanent return or a permit for resettlement. See Section 3, Influx from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1948, (Ordinance XVII of 1948), https://archive.org/details/in.gazette.e.1948.41/page/n1/mode/2up/search/Influx+from+Pakistan+(Control+)+Ordinance?q=Influx+from+Pakistan+%28Control+%29+Ordinance. This was later superseded by the Ordinance XXXIV of 1948, with effect from 10th November 1948, https://archive.org/details/in.gazette.e.1948.148/mode/2up/search/%22Influx+from+Pakistan%22?q=%22Influx+from+Pakistan%22 which went on to be superseded by the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, Act no. XXIII of 1949, with effect from April 22, 1949. The Influx Ordinances did not state that there would be different kinds of permits depending on the duration of stay or the intention of the migrant – a detail that was announced through the Rules. See Rules Regarding Permit System Introduced Between West Pakistan and India, dated 7th September 1948 issued under the Influx from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1948, https://archive.org/details/in.gazette.e.1948.84/mode/1up/search/Influx+from+Pakistan+(Control+)+Ordinance?q=Influx+from+Pakistan+%28Control+%29+Ordinance (last accessed on 28 April 2020).

[47] The Indian High Commission in Karachi was instructed not to issue permits to those Muslims who had initially intended to permanently migrate to Pakistan, and now sought to return. Joya Chatterji, South Asian Histories of Citizenship 1946-1970, The Historical Journal (2012) 55(4), 1049-1071, 1063.

[48] See for instance Speech of Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Constituent Assembly Debates 12 August 1949, Vol. 9.117.116-123. Hindu and Sikh refugees crossing the western border were sought to be rehabilitated, temporarily, in the homes of Muslim who fled in the wake of the September 1947 Delhi riots.What actually happened was that incoming refugees who had forcibly occupied the homes of fleeing Muslims, were allowed to keep them, thus leaving the owners of the homes unable to return to them after the riots ended. Zamindar, 28-9. Several of those who fled the riots moved to the refugee camp in Purana Qila and even boarded trains to Pakistan. Zamindar, 26-31, Zamindar writes of the camp at Purana Qila, which was taken over by the Indian Government in September 1947: “The camp at Purana Qila emerged as some 12,000 government employees who had “opted” to work for Pakistan and their families (who had initially congregated at the Transfer Office of the Pakistan government) were moved there by the Pakistani High Commission, until travel arrangements could be made for their departure to Pakistan. As word spread, other Muslims seeking refuge, with or without intentions to go to Pakistan, also came to Purana Qila, and within days over 50,000 Muslims of Delhi had taken refuge there… However, from the start it was suggested that “those in Purana Qila be separated into two lots,” those wanting to go to Pakistan and “those who wished to stay.” … the “general feeling” in the Emergency Committee was that there was “reason to believe that 90 percent wish to go out” or “would want to go to Pakistan.” Given that in fact most of the Muslims in Purana Qila did leave for Pakistan, it would seem that the estimates of the Emergency Committee were accurate. However, one report to the Emergency Committee noted that “[e]xact figures for the latter two categories [go to Pakistan or back to city] are extremely difficult—as large numbers have not as yet finally made up their minds.” See p. 34-37.

[49] Speech of Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Constituent Assembly Debates 12th August 1949, Volume 9.117.114. He went on to express a fear that any permit system may be administered in a discriminatory manner by overzealous officials: “It is said, for instance, that Assam wanted a permit system to be applied as between East Bengal and Assam. The Assam Government and the Government of India have discussed the matter between themselves. They have held more than one conference for the purpose of arriving at a solution of this trouble. And I shall not be revealing a secret if I say that at the last conference we had on this, subject, the general consensus of opinion amongst both representatives of the Government of India and the representatives of Assam was that it was not wise to introduce anything like a permit system between East Bengal and Assam on the same lines a obtain between West Pakistan and India. There are complications which perhaps it is unnecessary for me to go into in detail. One very big complication is the repercussion it will have as regards the movement of persons between East and West Bengal. Now, by permitting the extension of the, Permit system as it works between West Pakistan and India to the area between East Bengal and Assam, we shall be inviting Pakistan to introduce such a system as between East and West Bengal and I only mention this to people who are acquainted with both West Bengal and Assam for them to realize all the enormous complications, on the economy of West Bengal which it will entail. The last conference merely came to the conclusion that we should seek and apply other methods for preventing or mitigating the influx of a large number of Muslims from East Bengal to Assam …”  Raghavan writes “…[d] elegates at the Calcutta conference acknowledged that the economic viability of the region as a whole rested partly on the traditional networks of commerce and migration”. Pallavi Raghavan, The Making of South Asia’s Minorities, EPW, 45.

[50] In October 1948, some leaders met to discuss the possibility of a complete exchange of minority populations, to prevent such mass migrations from East Bengal. With alternatives like redrawing the Radcliffe line being out of question, reciprocal arrangements of accountability were the only way out.  Thus came into being the Inter Dominion Agreement, 1948 and the Nehru-Liaqat Pact, 1950. Pallavi Raghavan, EPW, 47-49.

[51] Chatterji notes the views of Prime Minister Nehru on influx of refugees on the east as,“…the product of largely imaginary fears and baseless rumours, not the consequence of palpable threats to Hindu life, limb and property.” In her words, “Long after the exodus from the east had begun, Nehru continued to delude himself that it could be halted, even reversed, provided government in Dacca could somehow be persuaded to deploy ‘psychological measures’ and restore confidence among the Hindu minorities who were leaving in droves.” Joya Chatterji (2007) 129. See also, Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents 63 (Harvard University Press 2013).

[52] Niraja Gopal Jayal 62-68.

[53] RK Chaudhury, Constituent Assembly Debates 12 August 1949, Vol 9.117.97.

[54] Sylhet in the Surma valley was a largely Muslim, Bengali district that was contiguous to East Bengal. After being incorporated into Assam in 1874 for “colonial administrative reasons”, Sylheti Hindus desired to be reunited with the more advanced Bengal while Sylheti Muslims preferred to remain in Assam where they had “a more powerful political voice than they would have had if they returned to a Muslim majority East Bengal.” Assamese locals, who were fearful of the possible hegemony Sylhetis would wield over their own people “with their earlier access to English education”, also supported its restoration to Bengal. Sanjib Baruah (2015), ibid; Madhumita Sengupta, Historiography of the Formation of Assamese Identity A Review, Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, 122; Anindita Dasgupta, Remembering Sylhet: A Forgotten Story of India’s 1947 Partition, Economic and Political Weekly 43(31) 2008, 18-22, 19.

[55] Dasgupta, ibid. Sanjib Baruah is of the view Sylhet’s partition’s effects are seen to the present day, in the way politicians engage with the public in the Brahmaputra and Barak valleys. Baruah opines: “In election campaigns in the Brahmaputra Valley in Assam, ruling party politicians including Prime Minister Narendra Modi speak incessantly about expelling “Bangladeshis”. Then they opportunistically change their rhetoric in the Barak Valley where a fundamentally different set of memories of the Partition prevails because a large number of people displaced by the Partition live there.” Baruah explains that the rhetoric of expelling Bangladeshis/Bengalis would not be reassuring to those in the Barak Valley, who “have long been supporters of the BJP precisely because it has historically sided with Partition refugees” (by offering to put them on citizenship track) who were largely Hindu in that region. See Sanjib Baruah, Citizens, non-citizens, minorities, The Indian Express, 28 June 2018 https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/assam-citizenship-amendment-bill-protests-national-register-of-citizens-citizenship-immigrants-sarbanand-sonowal-5236229/; Baruah, 2020, 69-70.

[56] The Barak valley is an extension of the Surma Valley of present day Bangladesh comprising Sylhet district’s Karimganj, Cachar, and Hailakandi. In Assam, Partition was experienced differently in the largely Bengali speaking Barak valley in southern Assam and the largely Assamese speaking Brahmaputra valley, further north. Sanjib Baruah, Partition and Politics of Citizenship in Assam, in Urvashi Butalia (ed.), Partition The Long Shadow (Zubaan 2015).

[57] Baruah (2015).

[58] Speech of RK Chaudhury, Constituent Assembly Debates 12 August 1949, Vol 9.117.95-103.

[59] Claire Alexander, 73.

[60] They had “… not long ago set up the struggle for Pakistan, they had not long before taken an active part in compelling the politicians of India to agree for partition”, and were only here to“exploit”Assam, he declared. Speech of R K Chaudhury, Constituent Assembly Debates 12 August 1949, 9.117.98-104. On the scapegoating of Bengali Muslims, see van Schendel, 211-212.

[61] See Udayon Misra, Burden of History Assam and the Partition- Unresolved Issues 63-85 (OUP Kindle Edition 2017).

[62] For instance, Ambedkar, without explicitly addressing the concerns of traditionally migrant labour communities, affirmed the secular ideal of Article 6 with the following speech: “…the criticism has mainly come from the representatives of Assam particularly as voiced by my friend Mr. Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri. If I understood him correctly his contention was that these articles relating to immigrants from Pakistan to India have left the gates open both for Bengalis as well as Muslims coming form East Bengal into Assam and either disturbing their economy or disturbing the balance of communal proportions in that province. I think, Sir he has entirely misunderstood the purport of the articles which deal with immigrants from Pakistan to India. If he will read the provisions again, he will find that it is only with regard to those who have entered Assam before 19th July 1948, that they have been declared, automatically so to say, citizens of Assam if they have resided within the territory of India. But with regard to those who, have entered Assam, whether they are Hindu Bengalees or whether they are Muslims, after the 19th July 1948, he will find that citizenship is not an automatic business at all. There are three conditions laid down for persons who have entered Assam after the 19th July 1948. …there is a very severe condition, namely that he must be registered by, an officer appointed by the Government of the Dominion of India. I would like to state very categorically that this registration power is a plenary power. The mere fact that a man has made an application, the mere fact that he has resided for six months in Assam, would not involve any responsibility or duty or obligation on registering officer to register him. Notwithstanding  that there is an application, notwithstanding that he has resided for six months, the officer will still have enough discretion left in him to decide whether he should be registered or he should not be registered. In other words, the officer would be entitled to examine, on such material as he may have before him, the purport for which he has come, such as whether he has come with a bona fide motive of becoming a permanent citizen of India or whether he has come with any other purpose. Now, it seems to me that having regard to these three limiting conditions which are made applicable to persons who enter Assam after 19th July 1948, any fear such as the one which has been expressed by my Friend Mr. Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri that the flood-gates will be opened to swamp the Assamese people either by Bengalees or by Muslims, seems to me to be utterly unfounded. If he has any objection to those who have entered Bengal before 19th July 1948- in this case on a showing that the man has resided in India, citizenship becomes automatic-no doubt that matter will be dealt with by Parliament under any law that may be made under article 6. If my friends from Assam will be able to convince Parliament that those who have entered Assam before 19th July 1948 should, for any reason that they may have in mind or they may like to put before Parliament, be disqualified, I have no doubt that Parliament will take that matter into consideration. Therefore, so far as the criticism of these articles relating to immigrants from Pakistan to Assam is concerned, I submit it is entirely unfounded.”. See Speech of Ambedkar, 12 August 1949, 9,117.138-9.

[63] Haimanti Roy, Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees, Citizens in India and Pakistan, 1947-65 History Faculty Publications (2012) Paper 21; Haimanti Roy, Paper Rights: The Emergence of Documentary Identities in Post-Colonial India, 1950-67, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 39(2), 329-349.

[64] Jasodhara Bagchi and Subhoranjan Dasgupta, The Problem, Seminar 2002.

[65] Joya Chatterji (2007) 119.

[66] This has prompted scholars to note that refugees largely were left to their own devices to settle and rehabilitate themselves, by grabbing and squatting on available, unoccupied lands, educating themselves and earning livelihoods. Joya Chatterji (2007)141-148. By 1973, 15% of West Bengal was comprised of refugees.

[67] They were settled in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, and the Dandakaranya region, comprising 80,000 square miles spanning the “Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh, the Koraput and Kalahandi districts of Orissa, and the Agency Tracts of Andhra Pradesh.” Sen, 211-9. See also Sarbani Bannerjee, 3, citing Basu Guha-Choudhury, 2009, 66-67.This posed the additional cost of impacting the settled lives of the local adivasi communities. Joya Chatterji (2007) 135-140.

[68] Nilanjan De, Partition of India and its Immediate Effect on Jhum Cultivation of Tripura, International Journal of Social Science & Interdisciplinary Research 1(8), August 2012, 185-190.

[69] Speech of Buragohian, Lok Sabha Debates 8 Feb 1950, 321.

[70] The Act permitted the ejection of classes of persons who had come into Assam although “ordinarily resident… outside India”, so long as they were not fleeing civil disturbances. See Section 2, Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950..

[71] Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, Lok Sabha Debates 8 August 1955, 9614-16: ““I know there are people who are evil-minded and who want to see trouble created in India, who would go to Kashmir and do all sorts of things, who would go to Assam and do all sorts of things. I am therefore clear in my mind that so far as citizenship is concerned, so far as Pakistan nationals are concerned, citizenship should be circumscribed with conditions and restrictions, so that the security of our State is not adversely affected. I am perfectly clear in my mind that this can be done very easily. In the exodus, lakhs and lakhs of people, are coming. They are coming at the rate of 30,000 a month. They are Hindus as well as Muslims. Now, the question arises: in our secular State, can we distinguish between Hindus and Muslims, can we make different laws? I would submit there is no such impractical difficulty. …After all, Government have discretion in the matter; Government can deprive a person of his citizenship if he becomes a citizen. Government are rehabilitating certain people, giving them some help. Some people are coming to this country and they treat this country as their home, but others come for other purposes. As between the two, Government can very easily make a distinction, and they can have a law by which only those who come to this country for the purpose of real asylum and who are our brethren in every meaning of the word, should be allowed to become citizens and not others.” He went on to suggest, after the Bill was scrutinized by the Joint Parliamentary Committee: “We could say that those persons who have come from East Bengal before the 1st January, 1955 should ipso facto be regarded to have become the citizens of India without any registration, etc. … These persons of Indian origin have lost their citizenship of undivided India because you agreed to the partition of India. Those Hindus living in East Bengal are the potential citizens of this country. I know that our Government is unable to stem the tide of those who are coming from there into India… Registration is only for those who are not the real citizens of India, nor are rooted in the land of India, nor have a domicile in this country, not wanting to return to any other country.” Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, Lok Sabha Debates, 3 December 1955, 1175-1177.

[72] Joya Chatterji (2007)120.

[73] Zaglul Haider, A Revisit to the Indian Role in the Bangladesh Liberation War, Journal of Asian and African Studies 2009, 44(5), 537, 541-542’ Antara Datta, Refugees and Borders in South Asia:The Great Exodus of 1971 (Routledge 2012).

[74] Subir Bhaumik, supra. The percentage of tribals was 63% in 1874, but only 28.44% in 1981.

[75] Zaglul Haider, 542. “According to an authoritative source, by the end of May 1971, nine million refugees had arrived in small hilly state of Tripura while the indigenous population of that state was only 1.5 million.”

[76] Sanjib Baruah (2015) 88.

[77] Memorandum of Settlement dt. 15 August 1985, signed between the AASU and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad, the Government of India and Government of Assam,  https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN_850815_Assam%20Accord.pdf.

[78] Niraja Gopal Jayal, 64.

[79] Statement of Objects and Reasons Amending Act 65 of 1985: The amendment’s objects read: “ 1. The core of the Memorandum of Settlement (Assam Accord) relates to the foreigners’ issue, since the agitation launched by the A.A.S.U arise out of their apprehensions regarding the continuing influx of foreign nationals into Assam and the fear about adverse effects upon the political, social, cultural and economic life of the State. 2. Assam Accord being a political settlement, legislation is required to give effect to the relevant clauses of the Assam Accord relating to the foreigners’ issue. 3. …”

[80] Section 2(a), Foreigners Act, 1946.

[81] Anupama Roy, Mapping Citizenship in India, 11-12 (OUP 2010). Ashna Ashesh and Arun K Thiruvengadam, Report on Citizenship Law: India 16 (European University Institute 2017).

Announcing the Release of Securing Citizenship

Following the excerpts of the reports published on the blog over the course of November, the Centre for Public Interest Law, JGLS, has published Securing Citizenship, which can be found here. The report identifies the critical legal issues surrounding precarious citizens and stateless persons in India. It recommends strengthening the existing legal framework in three interrelated chapters: Status, Detention, and Socio-Economic Rights. The report’s recommendations draw on international law, Indian law, and best practices across jurisdictions, situating their implementation in India’s complex and unique landscape.

This report is the outcome of a research partnership between the Centre for Public Interest Law (CPIL) at Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat (JGLS) and the Faculty of Law, Université Catholique de Lille. The authors convey their gratitude to the advisors – Amal de Chickera, Ioannis Panoussis, Niraja Gopal Jayal and Ravi Hemadri – for their important insights on the initial drafts of the report and guidance in navigating the law concerning statelessness. The authors are equally thankful to the commentators – Andrea Marilyn Pragashini Immanuel, Angshuman Choudhury, Ashna Ashesh, Carly A. Krakow, Darshana Mitra, Jessica Field, Sagnik Das, Suraj Girijashanker and Thibault Weigelt – for reviewing the report and sharing their detailed analyses.

The authors owe their thanks to Mohsin Alam Bhat, as Research Director, for lending his support and legal expertise to conduct this study. As research supervisor, Aashish Yadav coordinated and supervised the drafting of the report, guided the team at every stage, and structured their findings. The authors are very grateful for his passionate engagement and contribution to this report.

The team is grateful to Prof. E. Tendayi Achiume, Dr. Bronwen Manby, Prof. Michelle Foster, Amal de Chickera and Prof. Joshua Castellino for their respective endorsements of this report. The report carries a generous foreword by Prof. B.S. Chimni.

The team holds enormous appreciation for AbhilashRadhaKrishnan for designing the report and making it an enjoyable read. They are extremely grateful to Raki Nikahetiya for graciously allowing the use of his photograph as the cover image of this report.

The student authors of this report are:

Anushri Uttarwar, Arunima Nair, Khush Aalam Singh, Veda Singh, Vrinda Aggarwal, and Yamini Mookherjee from Jindal Global Law School.

Amandine Desmont, Claire Jacquot, Flora Turrado, Hélène Jolly, and Theo Antunes from Université Catholique de Lille.

We welcome responses to the report from our readers as submissions to the blog. The report authors encourage readers to write to them with thoughts and comments.

To foster engagement with the report, we invite you to attend the Securing Citizenship Webinar, organised in collaboration with Centre for Public Interest Law, JGLS. Our panelists include Amal de Chickera (Co-Founder & Co-Director, Institute on Statelessness & Inclusion), Sujata Ramachandran (Research Associate, Balsille School of International Affairs, Waterloo) and Oliullah Laskar (Advocate, Gauhati HC). Our moderator will be Mohsin Alam Bhat (Executive Director, CPIL). Please register at https://bit.ly/3lPXPOl to receive the link and password for the webinar.

Announcing the Release Schedule for ‘Securing Citizenship: report on India’s legal obligations towards precarious citizens and stateless persons’

This month, the Centre for Public Interest Law will release its Securing Citizenship report on India’s legal obligations towards precarious citizens and stateless persons. The Report reviews and comments on the key contemporary legal issues pertaining to citizenship and statelessness in India. Divided into three chapters – Citizenship StatusDetention and Socio-Economic Rights – the Report presents recommendations to strengthen the existing legal framework. It focuses on the deplorable conditions of precarious citizens in Assam and stateless persons in India to propose methods of prevention and reduction of statelessness itself. In providing current and immediately relevant legal tools to restore the security previously accorded to citizenship status, the Report aims to bolster advocacy efforts on statelessness in India.

To foster engagement with the report, CPIL is hosting a series of events and symposia in collaboration with Parichay – The Blog . The flagship event will be a webinar on the key themes of the report, taking place on 5th December. Below is the full schedule:

  • 18th November: Excerpts from ‘Securing Citizenship’ will be released on Parichay – The Blog. These excerpts are on the themes of legal recognition of statelessness, the rights of child detainees, and the socio-economic framework of rights for stateless persons. We invite you to reflect on these themes reflected in the excerpts before the release of the Report in its entirety.
  • Final week of November: The Report will be published on the Centre for Public Interest Law (JGU) website. Fellow academics, faculties, and students are invited to read, engage and discuss the Report. We strongly encourage responses to the Report which can be submitted to the Blog.
  • November through December: The blog will feature a series of posts by authors of the report, reflecting on contemporary legal developments relevant to the report. These posts will be accompanied by interviews with scholars with an academic background in studying statelessness in law and practice.
  • 5th December: CPIL and Parichay – The Blog will host a webinar on ‘Securing Citizenship’ with distinguished panelists to discuss the highlights of the report and their reflections on the issue of statelessness. In this flagship event, we hope to introduce the Report to a varied audience and invite anyone interested in the study of citizenship to attend. Please register at https://bit.ly/3lPXPOl to receive the link and password for the webinar.
  • January: Contributions by academics and students, including any submission of responses to the Report, will be published. The call for these contributions is open to all readers!

We look forward to your participation in the release of this report!

Interview with Oliullah Laskar

Mr Oliullah Laskar is an advocate who practices before the Gauhati High Court. He is part of the Barak Human Rights Protection Committee (BHRPC), a human rights organisation based in the Barak Valley in Assam. We speak to Mr Laskar about the difference between citizenship and immigration laws, the working of the Foreigner Tribunals, the problems with the NRC, and the tribulations of a lawyer who has fought cases before the FTs.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Oliullah Laskar: Before I begin answering your questions, I would like to give you some context to the Foreigners Act, 1946 and its use as a legislation to determine citizenship. The Foreigners Act (Act) is not equipped to deal with the situation in Assam or across India, if the NRC is implemented across the country. Because the mischief that was sought to be addressed by the Foreigners Act is different from the situation at hand.

The earliest version of the extant Act was passed as an ordinance in 1942. It was amended to become the law that is presently in force —the Foreigners Act 1946.

The Statement of Object and Reasons of the Act calls it a war emergency legislation. During the World Wars, governments tended to be more stringent about their boundaries and had placed restrictions on the entry of foreigners and immigrants. So the context of the promulgation of the legislation was the World War. We have to examine the context and immediate use of the Act in order to understand its present ineffectiveness.

The Foreigners Act, 1946 was not meant to be a legislation to determine citizenship. There is a difference between citizenship and immigration laws. An immigrant is presumed to be a foreigner and on the basis of that presumption she is denied most rights that are otherwise available to a citizen. However, in a citizenship determination exercise, we are determining the rights of people who are presumed to be citizens and already being treated as such.. Therefore, there is a distinction between immigration laws and laws relating to determination of citizenship.

You will find this distinction being recognised in international law jurisprudence. Even agencies of the UN have affirmed that the burden of proof should lie on the State in citizenship determination procedures. But in procedures related to immigration, in most western countries, the burden of proof is on the alleged immigrant. This was discussed in the Sarbananda Sonowal case. But the Supreme Court failed to distinguish between the process related to identification of immigrants and that of citizenship determination exercises. The SC did not make a distinction between otherwise distinct phenomena and therefore it was ruled that the burden of proof in a citizenship determination exercise, like the NRC, should be on the person alleged to be the foreigner.

The categories of persons to whom the Act is applicable is directly related to the question of burden of proof. If we assume that any person can be tried under the Act, then we will find ourselves in an absurd situation — anyone can be accused of being a foreigner.

If anyone can be sent to the Foreigner Tribunals (FT) there will be no meaning of the voter list, casting your vote, forming the government.  If people who have elected the government are being sent to the FTs, what is the legitimacy of the government? At present, we are in this difficult situation because of our failure to distinguish between immigration laws and laws for determining citizenship.

Natasha Maheshwari: In 2019, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that in “nationality determination processes, the burden of proof should lie with the State and not with the individual”. Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 places the burden of proving citizenship on an individual. Do you think that the IMDT Act, which placed the burden of proof on the State, was more equipped to deal with the question of citizenship?

OL: Citizenship is a very important question. It is not only the question of a person’s rights but of his life as a member of civilised society. The life of his progeny also depends on his citizenship. So it is a very, very serious matter. In fact it is more significant than capital trials.

If we follow a standard of due process or abide by the rule of law rules then the procedure will be stringent. The procedure adopted should be as stringent as that of a criminal trial.

In cases where a person who already enjoys her rights as a citizen under a legal presumption, like having her name in a voter list, is alleged to be a foreigner, the burden of proof should lie on the person who questioned her citizenship status. But in cases where an alleged immigrant is asked to prove her citizenship, the burden of proof should lie on the immigrant herself.

Like the Foreigners Act, the IMDT Act also used a quasi-judicial procedure to determine citizenship. Citizenship should be determined through a trial conducted by a regular court of law, the burden of proof being on the shoulder of those who allege foreignness of the person who is otherwise legally presumed to be a citizen. The proof that is given should be beyond reasonable doubt. Quasi-judicial tribunals like FTs or IMDTs can deal with cases of people who have a legal presumption of being a foreigner like people overstaying the validity of their travel documents which are now being dealt with in criminal proceedings conducted by judicial magistrates. The tribunals, therefore, appear redundant.

NM:  In your opinion, what are some of the problems with the NRC?

OL: There are criticisms from both sides  i.e. advocates for the NRC and those who are against it. The advocates of the NRC say that many people who should not be in the NRC have been included in the list.

Though the NRC intended to detect illegal immigrants, the process was not limited to them. Every citizen of India living in Assam had to file an application giving proof of their citizenship. The burden of proof was on them.

How is the government examining the capacity to vote of the very people who elected them? This is the main problem with the NRC. The other problem is that Clause 3(3) of the Act states that certain persons can register as original inhabitants (OI) if the registering authority is satisfied that they are OIs. But there is no definition of the term OI or procedure for determining who they are. In practice, this clause is applied on the basis of linguistic and ethnic identity.

Another problem is the virtual exclusion of certain types of oral and documentary evidence from the NRC process. As per Section 3 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, people who are born in India before 1987 are citizens by birth.

However, in the NRC application form, there was no provision to claim citizenship by birth by producing a birth certificate. Several countries have restricted the right to claim citizenship, but the basic democratic principle is that a person born in a country has a right to claim citizenship.

However, there is another distinction —  if it is applied to immigrants whose country of origin is known and admitted then it is a different question. If a couple has immigrated from another country with their child and are now living in India with valid travel documents then maybe the country of origin can grant citizenship to their child. But if neither India nor the country of origin recognises the citizenship of the child, then the child will be rendered stateless.

With respect to the right of a person to stay in a country, the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Hoti v. Croatia,  has ruled that a person who has lived in a country for a very long time cannot be thrown out. 

While India hasn’t ratified the two international conventions on statelessness, Article 21 can be read in a manner such that a person cannot be rendered stateless, because without citizenship one will not have any dignity. Statelessness is the absence of rights. Hannah Arendt has called it civil death. Therefore, Article 21 will prevent a person from being made stateless.

NM: The objective of the National Register of Citizens in Assam was to identify illegal migrants, a long-standing demand of the Assam movement, which found expression in Clause 5 of the Assam Accord and Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955.  Do you think that the NRC has been successful in fulfilling this objective?

OL: I don’t know whether the NRC has failed in its objective but the rhetoric of illegal immigrants is questionable. There are no authoritative findings which prove that there are a large number of immigrants in Assam. The Supreme Court has relied on Governor S.K. Sinha’s report. However, what is the authority of a Governor to make such a report? He is a Governor not the Government.

He did it in his personal capacity and not as the head of the State of Assam. As a Governor does he have this authority? What was the methodology by which he arrived at these numbers?

The works based on census reports does not reveal a significant amount of illegal immigration from our neighbouring countries. There may be illegal immigration but not as much as has been made out to be by the S.K. Sinha report.

An independent enquiry on the question of illegal immigrants should be made and if the committee concludes that there are a large number of illegal migrants they should be deported to their country. But which country do you deport them to? If it is Bangladesh then you cannot do so unless the Bangladeshi government accepts them as their citizens.

In its judgment in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha, the Supreme Court directed the Indian government to speak with their Bangladeshi counterpart to discuss deportation. However, this was not implemented. The acceptance of the Bangladesh government may depend on the process that India uses to detect illegal immigrants. If the process is agreed upon by both countries then if someone is found to be a Bangladeshi immigrant, the government will take them back.

There are many instances of people extending their travel visas and continuing their stay. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Access requires the government to inform consular authorities about an arrest. If the Bangladesh authorities find that a person who has been arrested for overstaying their visa is a Bangladeshi citizen then they will take them back. The Kulbhushan Jadhav case, which was fought before the ICJ, dealt with the issue of giving consular access to a foreign national. And if consular access is not given, civil society organisations intervene and contact the government of the country from which the person originates.

In the paragraphs above, I am referring to cases in which immigrants are involved. But the NRC is not directly related to such immigrants; the NRC is a process to deprive people who have been living in Assam for generations together of their rights as a citizen.

Even the Prime Minister of India has assured Bangladesh that the NRC is an internal matter. This means there is no question of deportation — the NRC is simply an exercise to make people stateless.

Amnesty International India’s report titled Designed to Exclude shows that the FT members are pressured to declare people as foreigners. There is a process of assessment of the performance of the FT members.  Declaring more people as foreigners is considered an assessment of excellence. Comparatively, the members who declare less people as foreigners are considered to have performed poorly.

Most of the FT members are on contract and they are under tremendous pressure to declare as many people as foreigners as possible. Apart from this, the Gauhati High Court (HC) has generated a sort of jurisprudence on the foreigner tribunals. There are mainly two rules made by the HC (there is no legislative basis for them):

1. In proceedings before the FT oral evidence has no significance.

2. If a document bears an unauthorised impression of a national emblem then it is not admissible.

For establishing linkage, often, women produce a certificate issued by the elected local government (Panchayat president). Panchayat presidents function under Assam’s Panchayat Act. Under the Prevention of Misuse of National Emblem Act 2005, and the Rules made in 2007 there is a schedule enumerating the authorities who can use the national emblem. Panchayat presidents are not allowed to use the national emblem. But they continue to do so.

So when the certificate is produced by the Panchayat president saying that he knows of this person and that they are the son/daughter of so and so whose name appears in the 1971 voter list, this certificate of proof of relationship is not admitted. This is because it uses the national emblem. However, no Panchayat president is ever prosecuted for wrongful usage.

In India the only thing which is considered to determine admissibility of evidence is relevance. If it is relevant it is admissible (the latest judgment on the matter is the verdict of the 3 judge bench in the Rafale review case). If a document is obtained through  criminal or illegal means it is still admissible if it is relevant. But the HC ignores this rule when it comes to trials under the Foreigners Act, 1946

So the first rule excludes oral evidence and the second rule excludes the documents that are available to many people.

These rules make it easier for the FTs to declare people as foreigners.

In most cases people fail to establish relationships with their parents. Section 50 of the Evidence Act, which lays down the evidence that can be used to prove a relationship, is also ignored.

In some cases oral evidence is recorded but not discussed in the decision by the FT or HC. According to the HC oral evidence has no significance before the FT. By excluding oral evidence, the HC has also disregarded the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of  Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer. While the judgment does not directly deal with the admissibility of oral evidence, it assumes the admissibility of all types of evidence before the court in citizenship matters. 

NM: Recently, at a lecture at the National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS), you said that the NRC process is exclusionary and discriminatory towards women in general and women from marginalised communities in particular. Can you elaborate?

OL: In 2016, I was sitting in a courtroom in the Gauhati HC. The bench was dealing with challenges filed against FT orders. The Presiding Judge, who is now the CJI of Sikkim HC, Justice A.K. Goswami asked why most of the challenges to FT orders were filed by women.

It is simple — more women are declared as foreigners by the FT which is why more women come to the High Court. It was a general observation made by the Court so the lawyer arguing did not answer Justice Goswami. But the question remains.

Most people who are declared as foreigners belong to the poorest section of the society. These people are uneducated and don’t have a board exam certificate or a birth certificate which can be used to prove relationship with their parents which in turn proves their citizenship. Additionally, the registration of marriage, particularly in the Muslim community, was not compulsory. It was made compulsory by an SC judgment pronounced much later.  However, even after it was made compulsory, a marriage that is not registered is still valid. As a result, many women do not have marriage certificates. Lastly, though the law gives women the right to inherit property, in practice this does not happen in most cases. As a result, often, women are unable to produce documentary proof to establish a relationship, particularly with their fathers.

In the case of men, some of them study up to matriculation and have board certificates. Those who do not have board certificates have land documents on which they mutate their name in the place of parents. They can use this document to show their relationship with their father. Men also put their father’s name on the voter list.

Women are frequently married before the age of 18 (even after the Child Marriage Act was enacted in 2006). So a young woman who marries before attaining majority  cannot enrol herself in the voter’s list of her paternal home; thereby proving that she is daughter of her father. So she enrols her name after she attains majority. Since she is already married, she uses her husband’s name in the voter list and not her father’s. So, the voter list does not help her to prove her relationship with her father.

There are several other reasons why women are excluded from the NRC, most of them deeply rooted in patriarchy. I have also heard of cases where a woman, who has left her husband’s house because of a domestic dispute, gets a notice at her matrimonial home. Because of the domestic dispute, the husband does not communicate the receipt of the notice. As a result, an ex parte order is passed against her. 

The reasons I have mentioned are not exhaustive. If fieldwork is conducted there are many other reasons that will come up. For example, if a family receives a notice from an FT in the name of a woman then too much importance will not be given to it. This is because a woman is not thought of as a very important member of the family. Even if the family appoints a lawyer, they will look for a cheap lawyer and won’t make too much of an effort to collect the documents that are required.

NM: Persons excluded from the NRC were supposed to receive rejection orders by March. Thereafter, the appeals process would begin. Now, because of COVID-19 and the catastrophic floods, the rejection process has been paused. How do you expect the appeals process to proceed? And how has the pandemic affected the lives of the people whose citizenship is in limbo?

OL: I am not sure. I saw a statement attributed to the new state coordinator of the NRC or an official from his office saying that they were in the process of preparing the rejection orders. However, due to technical problems in the database of the information preservation system, the data needed to be re-entered. This process of re-entry of data will take a few months.

But this pandemic has devastated the lives of people;  people have lost their jobs and there is scarcity of means to attain a livelihood. So even if the appeals process starts after the pandemic ends, it will be very difficult for these people because they will still be struggling to sustain themselves.

NM: As someone associated with the Barak Human Rights Protection Committee, what do you think is the role of broader civil society in resolving the question of citizenship and migration in Assam?

OL: A few years back I tried to speak with people who were working with human rights groups to make a position on this issue. If by civil society, you mean the human rights community, I think these people should come together and take a clear position on these issues.

The other part of the civil society, that is, bar associations, employees associations, the leadership of whom are members of the dominant communities, are not bothered about what is happening to the people excluded from the NRC.

 Even the people who profess to work from a human rights perspective are divided on the issue on ethnic lines. But some groups — for example, some women’s right organisations have taken a stand on one or two issues. However, even they haven’t taken a collective position and dealt with the NRC issue as a whole.  If an initiative is taken to get these human rights organisations to work together it will be much better. 

NM: Several FT lawyers have spoken of harassment and stigmatisation that they face due to the nature of their work. To add to that, a 2017 performance appraisal report of the members of the Foreigner Tribunals evinced that members who had declared a greater number of foreigners were more likely to be retained of their services in contrast to those who had declared fewer foreigners.

As an FT lawyer who has contended with threats and is arguing before a tribunal that is potentially prejudiced, what has been your experience? What motivates you to continue taking up citizenship law matters?

OL: I don’t appear before the FT very often because my practice is primarily before the HC. So personally, I haven’t faced one which is remotely uncomfortable. But I have heard about this from other lawyers. The newspapers had also reported a case of a scuffle within the courtroom.

But there were two cases that I recently dealt with — an interlocutory application was filed in both the cases but the application was not taken on record. So the lawyer in the case contacted me. I advised him to approach the local bar association. A delegation of the bar association spoke to the tribunal member but the application was still not taken on record.  Our request was only for the member to take it on record, if he felt that it was not sustainable the tribunal could reject it by passing an order. Then, I filed a writ petition before the HC, which directed the tribunal to accept the application

This shows that some of the tribunals are hostile towards the lawyers and they don’t even follow the minimum rule of procedures.

Natasha Maheshwari is a 5th year student at Maharashtra National Law University Mumbai. She is a core team member at Parichay.

A Fact-Sheet on Detention Centres in India

This is the second in a three-part series of guest posts by Paresh Hate. Paresh Hate is a PhD candidate at Centre for Comparative Politics and Political Theory, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Their work revolves around critically engaging with the discourse of ‘Bangladeshi infiltrator’ in Indian politics by looking at immigration detention and immigration law as sites of its cultivation, deployment and legitimization. Paresh is the digital editor for Migrant Solidarity Network – India and is a founding member of Hasratein: a queer collective, LGBTQIA+ resource group and political organisation based in New Delhi, India.

As argued in the first part of this series, immigration detention is neither a recent development nor limited to Assam. It has been part of the punitive mechanism set up by immigration law, particularly Section 3(2)(e) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and para 11(2) of The Foreigners Order, 1948, since its inception.

Recent detention centres are mandated under Amit Shah’s Model Detention Manual 2019, which was released on 9 January 2019, according to which one detention camp should exist in one the city or district where a major immigration check post is located and every member of a family should be housed in the same detention centre.

However, immigration detention has a long history in India, and such sites of detention are to be found all over the country. The immigrant foreigner population in detention centres in India is convicted under one or more of the four acts pertaining to immigration law, i.e. 1) The Foreigners Act, 1946; 2) the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939; 3) the Passport Act, 1967; and 4) the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920.

While the case of Assam detention centres clearly shows that there are plenty of Indian citizens, particularly Bengali-speaking individuals, who end up in detention centres, the state maintains these sites for unauthorized immigrants. I use the term ‘unauthorized’ for two reasons: first, to problematize ascribing legality onto humans on the move and to attempt to destigmatize the ideological connotations associated with illegality; second, to point out that many who are stuck in the detention regime possess documents of some kind but are insufficient by state’s evidentiary standards to prove their “undetainability”. In this sense, ‘unauthorized’ refers to individuals without official permission to enter a nation-state, because they are marked racially, religiously, gender-wise, class-wise, or due to the bureaucratic and administrative protocols which disallow them to be seen as legitimate candidates for permission to enter or claim citizenship.

Until early 2000s, the population that was accused and convicted in immigration matters was kept in prisons that operated as makeshift spaces for detaining “illegal immigrants” who violated the clauses of the immigration law and may have additionally committed a crime under India’s penal laws. This practice continues even today in most parts of the country.

According to the Prison Statistics India 2019 Manual of National Crime Records Bureau, as of 31st December 2019, there are total 5608 foreign prisoners in India, out of which around 2171 are convicts, 2979 are undertrials, 40 are detenues (mostly in Jammu and Kashmir and Delhi), and 418 are held as other kind of prisoners. Out of these, the highest number is that of Bangladeshis who constitute around 2513 of these prisoners. Estimates of foreigners and non-citizens omit child detainees in juvenile homes and those held at other quasi-correctional state institutions such as the Reception Centres outside the prison system. Bengali-speaking population is also the most precarious group facing penalties under immigration law and are under threat due to the National Register of Citizens.

As of now, there are different detention centres across the country which function for punitive and non-punitive purposes managed by state government correctional homes, shelter homes, Border Security Force camps, and sites of Foreigners Regional Registration Office.

Assam:

The first de facto detention centres were built in the state of Assam under High Court’s orders of 2008 for detaining declared foreigners. In July 2009, the Revenue Minister Bhumidhar Barman of Assam had informed the state assembly that two detention camps would be set up to hold illegal immigrants at Mancachar and Mahisashan. By 2010, three such detention camps had begun at Goalpara, Silchar and Kokrajhar. In the next few years, three more detention camps had started functioning at Tezpur, Jorhat and Dibrugarh.

Currently, under the Model Detention Manual 2019, the current biggest detention centre meant for illegal immigrants is being built in Goalpara district’s Matia which shall house at least 3000 inmates.

New Delhi:

In Delhi, there are three publicly known locations where immigrants are detained. Two of them are managed by the Department of Social Welfare of Government of Delhi. One of them is located at Nirmal Chaaya in West Delhi which holds immigrant women and another is at Lampur Complex in North Delhi which holds immigrant men. This population includes trafficked women, irregular economic migrants, and refugees. The third one is at Shahzada Bagh and is managed by Foreigners Regional Registration Office in West Delhi and exclusively holds Bangladeshi unauthorized immigrants.

According to the data of Global Detention Project, a Geneva-based human rights organisation, the union territory of Delhi has had five other detention centres which are not publicly known. These are 1) Human Resources Department Cell at Hauz Khas which was in use at least till 2005 housing adult unauthorized immigrant men; 2) a detention site at Daryaganj which was in use at least till 2005, housing adult unauthorized immigrant men; 3) Alipur Road detention house managed by Foreigners Regional Registration Office which was in use at least till 2008; 4) Daya Basti Ren Basera which was in use at least till 2005 housing adult unauthorized immigrant men; and 5) Old Delhi Seva Kutir which was in use at least till 2005 housing adult unauthorized immigrant men. The current status of these five sites is unknown.

Punjab:

Punjab currently houses unauthorized immigrants at Central Jail, Amritsar. These are individuals who are declared foreigners.

Rajasthan:

Rajasthan holds unauthorized immigrants on jail premises in Alwar. These are individuals who are declared foreigners.

Gujarat:

One detention centre in Gujarat is located at Bhuj. Another one which was at least in use till 2009 was located at a Special Operations Group (SOG) Office which was a criminal police station in Ahmedabad that housed both immigrant men, women and accompanied minors.

Goa:

Goa has had a detention centre since early 2019 where it houses convicted immigrants who are declared foreigners. It is located at Mapusa sub-jail in North Goa.

Tamil Nadu:

In Tamil Nadu, an intermediate camp has been made that used to earlier be a women’s prison in the city of Trichy. At present, it houses around 60 foreigners, most of whom are Sri Lankans. The site is guarded by Tamil Nadu Special Police commandos and is handled by the state revenue department. Because it is the revenue department that manages this site, the nature of the site also differs. In the case of Tamil Nadu, it means that the location is maintained to supervise offenders who are neither under the usual restrictions of probation nor fully incarcerated because all the detenues are undertrials and are allowed to meet family members. Many of these detenues also await deportation.

West Bengal:

West Bengal maintains its own correctional homes at different locations segregated on the basis of gender. There has also been a Border Security Force camp which was last documented to be in use in 2005. Earlier, the West Bengal government had also agreed to build new detention centres at New Town and Bongaon but these plans have been halted recently.

Bihar:

Bihar has a military camp, which according to the sources of Global Detention Project, that houses unauthorized immigrants. It was at least in use until 2005.

Karnataka:

Under the Model Detention Manual 2019, Karnataka has opened its first detention centre at Nelamangala Taluk, Banglore which will be administered by the state Social Welfare Department.

Maharashtra:

Under the Model Detention Manual 2019, Maharashtra was to set up its first detention centre in Nerul, Navi Mumbai which was an erstwhile women’s shelter home run by the local police station. But since the change of the state government and the clash between Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party, the plans have been put on halt.

Uttar Pradesh:

Uttar Pradesh was supposed to have its first detention centre in Ghaziabad’s Nandgram at an erstwhile SC/ST hostel whose plans were cancelled after protests. Since the state government is ruled by the same party in power in the central government, it is very likely that another location will be soon selected for starting a detention centre in the state.

Usually, when one files an RTI application with the Ministry of Home Affairs (Foreigners Division) to find out details about these detention centres in the country, the Central Public Information Officer responds that this information is not centrally maintained. In many cases of RTI application, a copy of the RTI application is transferred to the Central Public Information Officer of the Bureau of Immigration for providing any details they have. However, the Bureau of Immigration responds and has a precedent of responding that they are exempted from the Second Schedule of the RTI Act, 2005 as a body from providing information that has the importance of national security. There is hardly any legal provision available to know more about these detention centres since the central government has the power to regulate access to the places in India where internees or persons on parole are detained or restricted under Section 4(4) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. This was confirmed by a personal RTI that I had made and keeping a track of the results of other similar RTIs.

Under UNHCR guidelines, detention cannot be used arbitrarily, and any decision to detain must be based on an assessment of the individual’s particular circumstances. This is hardly followed by authorities in India and routine flouting of due process is commonplace. Secondly, according to UNHCR guideline 4.3, detention can be used to protect public order, public health, and national security. However, as is clear from Indian state’s official narrative premised on securitization, almost all unauthorized and undocumented immigration constitutes “infiltration” and the polititicians consistently have called it a threat to India’s national security which can be used to justify indefinite detention for foreigners, particularly for those coming from Bengali or Bangladeshi backgrounds.

All of this proves the absolute lack of transparency in the matter of immigration detention centres in India. While harrowing tales are common in case of American immigration system or European Union’s gated community with regards to immigrants, there is little knowledge of countries in the Global South, including India. Such lack of transparency only adds to this effect where the public due to its lack of information fails to make a significant intervention in the question of justice and due process when it pertains to immigrants.